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PART ONE: JAPAN

Section I. JAPANESE POSITIONS IN THE DEFENSE

1. INTRODUCTION

The information in this section is largely supplemental to data on Japanese defense positions printed in the last three issues of the *Intelligence Bulletin* (Vol. II, Nos. 6, 7, and 8). Paragraph 2 summarizes information on enemy defense installations on the Marshall Islands, paragraph 3 describes the construction of Japanese bunkers or pillboxes in Burma, and paragraph 4 consists of paraphrases from enemy sources which deal with defensive positions.

2. AS SEEN ON THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

As a rule, the principal defensive installations on the beaches consisted of barbed wire strung on coconut-log posts, which were imbedded in the ground approximately along the line of the high water mark. The posts were inclined seaward at an angle of about 30 degrees to the vertical. Many of these logs were not firmly imbedded. Not more than four strands of wire were strung to these posts in any area. The strands were widely spaced and lightly attached to the posts. In several places wire had not been strung, but reels

of wire were found nearby, indicating that construction of defenses was underway just prior to the U. S. attack.

Immediately inland of the beach defenses were strong points which consisted of an intricate pattern of trenches and machine-gun and mortar positions. The Japanese used numerous 13-mm machine guns and small mortars, but no large artillery.

In a few areas, the barbed wire and the trenches were supplemented with a perimeter concrete wall, in sections. These sections, 3 to 4 feet high, were anywhere from 11½ to 40 feet in length. The space between adjacent sections was about 3 feet. The concrete wall probably was designed primarily as an antitank obstacle.

Located behind the wire obstacles in some areas were simple tank traps of the trench type. The trenches were about 8 feet wide and 6 feet deep with steep sides.

The Japanese used reinforced concrete extensively for storage structures, ammunition dumps, heavy gun emplacements, blockhouses, and power plants, and for protection of radio equipment.

On one of the Marshall Islands, there were numerous circular reinforced-concrete structures, about 7 feet high, which apparently were intended for use as pillboxes.

3. AS SEEN IN BURMA

Japanese pillboxes and bunkers found in the Burma theater of operations have varied considerably in size.

(Roughly speaking, bunkers are larger and more rectangular than pillboxes.) Some of the bunkers have been large enough to accommodate 40 men, approximately a platoon.

Bunkers are seldom located singly, but are generally found in groups of six or more, which are mutually supporting and form a strong defensive position. Following the usual principle of defense in depth, the Japanese generally locate their bunkers so that they can be supported by fire from the rear as well as from the sides. Heavy machine guns are often sited on the flanks for cross firing. The bunker positions are frequently surrounded by wire obstacles and booby traps. (Antipersonnel and antitank mines may also be utilized on occasion.)

A system of slit trenches and foxholes is almost always constructed close to the bunkers—and sometimes inside them. In utilizing these supporting positions, the Japanese are believed to vary their tactics. When the opposing fire power is light or moderate, they may fire from the outside positions, but when the opposing fire is heavy, they retire to the bunkers and fire light and heavy machine guns on fixed lines. However, especially when the bunkers are subjected to heavy artillery fire, the enemy may utilize the outside positions to meet an expected attack by opposing infantry troops.

Bunkers usually have four or more firing slits, which permit a comparatively wide field of fire. These slits measure 8 to 12 inches vertically and up to 4 feet

horizontally. Normally, the slits are just above ground level. The bunkers themselves generally project from 1 to 6 feet above the ground and are well camouflaged with natural vegetation.

The entrance to bunkers generally faces the rear, and connect to other bunkers or foxholes by means of communication trenches. The extent of these communication trenches depends largely on the length of time the position has been occupied.

Particularly if they are located some distance from a road, bunkers may frequently be stocked with large supplies of food and ammunition.

The Japanese have constructed bunkers on various types of terrain. However, such positions are usually located either in relatively flat jungle country containing rice-field clearings and comparatively good roads or in hilly jungle where roads and trails are few and narrow and generally follow the ridges.

4. ACCORDING TO ENEMY SOURCES

a. General

The information presented below on Japanese defensive positions has been paraphrased from enemy sources. This data apparently was prepared primarily for use in the South Pacific.

Our [Japanese] system of field fortifications are constructed on the principles of the Maginot Line. We stress defense in width and depth; we stress positions strong enough to withstand bombing and shell fire, and the necessity for adequate communication trenches or tunnels, alternate observation posts,

and suitable positions from which to launch counterattacks in case of temporary setbacks.

Positions are constructed so that whenever one emplacement or part of the setup is taken by hostile forces, we can counter-attack and retake it. Positions must also be constructed so that, regardless of the direction of attack, we can make good use of our firing power from supporting positions.

As pointed out in previous instructions, we must construct a number of dummy and alternate emplacements in order to deceive the hostile forces and cause them to disperse their fire over a wide area.

We must, as time permits, provide cover for such important places as machine-gun emplacements, observation posts, and so forth.

Living quarters should be set up behind and within the positions, but they must be far enough away from guard posts to prevent destruction by hostile fire. In some instances, it is advisable to set up installations to resemble native dwellings. The floors should be as high as possible.

Rather than build a small number of large air-raid trenches, it is better to construct many small ones. Take advantage of steep slopes as much as possible.

b. Two Squad Positions

Figure 1 is a sketch of a Japanese squad position for all-around defense. The individual "shelters" shown in the sketch are probably rifle pits, because an enemy instruction said: "Endeavor to build the shelters for firing while standing." They are supposed to be constructed more than 10 yards apart.

The "light shelters," each to be occupied by three men, are probably the small-type coconut-log pillboxes, which the Japanese have constructed frequently in the

South Pacific. According to an enemy source, these positions "are to be made as small as possible, and dispersed at intervals of about 20 yards."

The individual shelters or pits are connected by communication trenches.




Figure 1.—Japanese Squad Position.

According to a Japanese source considered fairly reliable, a squad of 10 men normally occupies each bunker in enemy positions in the Burma theater. Runners are used for communication between bunkers and with rear echelons. When hostile planes attack, all except sentries go into the bunkers. However, when hostile infantry attacks, most of the squad take up firing positions outside because rifle fire is limited inside the bunkers.

Several reports from the South Pacific relate the use of a "spider-trap" hole by the Japanese. Enemy pillboxes frequently have one of these holes located on each side, about 8 feet out. The holes have jungle cover and are 2 or 3 feet long. The enemy, equipped with individual two-power periscopes, crouch in these holes to observe the approach of hostile forces.

During recent action in the Solomon Islands, U. S. troops discovered that the Japanese were using their Model 99 light-armored shield to protect firing ports. These shields, which are casehardened, were described in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pages 14 and 15. They are $\frac{1}{4}$ inch thick instead of $\frac{1}{8}$ inch, as stated in No. 7.

c. A Platoon Position

A sketch of a Japanese platoon position for all-around defense is shown in figure 2. Japanese instructions stipulated that the position be constructed with a perimeter of 325 to 450 yards and a depth of 215 to 325 yards.

The instructions also stipulated that a field of fire be cleared for a distance of at least 50 yards outside the perimeter; that alternate positions be set up (so that a proper choice of position can be made to enable the heavy artillery weapons to fire over the widest possible range); that one or two lookouts be posted in the intervals between squads; and that numerous observation posts be prepared.




Figure 2.—Japanese Platoon Position.

d. Two Company Positions

Figure 3 is a Japanese sketch of an infantry company in an all-around defensive position. Apparently this company has three rifle platoons and a heavy-weapons platoon. (Although companies in most Japanese divisions have only three platoons and a headquarters squad, some also have a heavy-weapons platoon.)

It is interesting to note the typical Japanese method of defending a ravine or small valley, illustrated in figure 3. Also note how the enemy is utilizing other

terrain features in his all-around defense, and his plans for No. 4 platoon to counterattack.




Figure 3.—Japanese Company Position.

Figure 4 is another type of Japanese all-around defensive position "for a front-line infantry company." Note the extensive all-around use of obstacles by each platoon and the double row of abatis in front of the company position. Also, note how the positions are located in depth; the frontage is only slightly greater than the depth.




Figure 4.—Japanese Company Position.

The following Japanese instructions for an infantry company to follow in digging in during an attack may be worthy of study:

The authority for digging in during an attack rests with the company commander; the platoon commander may assume this authority only when the attack has bogged down.

In digging in, the light machine guns will be sent forward first, to a predetermined position, to construct earthworks.

During this time the other skirmishers will maintain a covering fire. When the light machine gunners have finished their earthworks, the skirmishers will advance under the covering fire of the light machine guns and begin constructing earthworks.

Against a strong hostile position, construct positions successively as you advance. Company commanders will carefully estimate the hostile situation, and will not advance too hastily.

Section II. JAPANESE DEFENSIVE TACTICS

1. GENERAL

A reliable Japanese source states that the two chief aims of defense consist of:

“a. Overcoming a numerical weakness of personnel by advantageous use of terrain, by establishing suitable fortifications, by making exhaustive battle preparations, and by

“b. Rushing the hostile forces by the simultaneous use of fire power and the counterattack.”

The primary function of fortifications, according to the same enemy source, is to enable the proper development of fire power and the accomplishment of other battle duties. The protection of personnel, weapons, and so forth from hostile fire is a “secondary” purpose of fortified positions.

Japanese stress on aggressiveness in defense was demonstrated on Betio Island. In numerous instances, Japanese soldiers, after having been driven from positions, returned to them after U. S. troops had failed to destroy the positions or to guard or occupy them.

2. USE OF FIRE POWER

During the height of operations in New Guinea, the

Japanese issued the following instructions regarding fields of fire:

Even if we have good positions for our weapons, we cannot use fire power effectively unless obstructions are removed from our field of fire. Obstructions must be removed, but bear in mind that too much clearing will expose our positions. Therefore, using discretion, clear away jungle grass, underbrush, and so forth only to the extent necessary for our weapons to fire effectively.

Disperse observation posts so that any hostile forces infiltrating into our lines will not escape us. Our observation of fire must be good, and we must never cease observation, even while under hostile fire.

Observers in the Burma theater of operations report that the Japanese seldom open fire from their defensive positions unless an assault is actually made against them. Individual enemy riflemen, in trees or under the roots of trees, are given the task of dealing with hostile reconnaissance patrols which approach close to the positions. The Japanese do nothing that would prematurely give away the location of an automatic weapon.

The enemy usually holds his fire until assaulting forces are from 30 to 50 yards from his positions.

3. COUNTERATTACK

Japanese counterattacks from defensive positions are usually made by small groups, and are preceded by a shower of grenade-discharger shells. The maximum personnel generally used are an officer and 12

men, and automatic weapons furnish most of the fire power. These attacks are launched within 10 minutes after our forces penetrate an enemy position. The Japanese either attack from the rear of a position our troops are assaulting or from a neighboring position—the latter is less likely. In any case, the effectiveness of the attack depends upon the speed and surprise with which it is made.

On a New Georgia front, Japanese forces launched a total of five counterattacks, one of which came at night. In the night attack, the enemy largely employed grenades, which possibly were fired from grenade dischargers held in an almost horizontal position. The daylight attacks were characterized by intense and sustained automatic fire, waist high. In one attack, after failing to locate any flank due to our all-around defense, the enemy used grenades and machine guns to clear the undergrowth sufficiently to reveal our positions.

4. ANTIPATROL MEASURES

A report from the Burma theater describes the following measures the Japanese have taken against opposing patrols:

a. The enemy sometimes dug positions, and left them empty (but covered by men hidden nearby) in the hope that hostile patrols would become curious.

b. The enemy often placed very fine trip wires across jungle tracks leading to his positions. These wires usually had tin-can alarms attached to them.

c. Japanese sentries, posted forward of positions, made a practice of withholding their fire at the approach of hostile reconnaissance patrols until they were certain of the situation. (Many such patrols, owing to this practice, were able to locate the Japanese positions and get away.)

Section III. HOW A FIJI PATROL GOT 47 JAPS WITHOUT LOSS

The details of how a Fiji patrol succeeded in killing at least 47 Japanese without suffering any losses are presented in this section. The patrol, consisting of one platoon, left its camp in Bougainville on the morning of 31 January 1944, and proceeded toward Pipipaia, a village about 2 miles inland from the coast, after receiving reports that Japanese were in that area. On the afternoon of 1 February, as the patrol approached Pipipaia, scouts were sent ahead to determine whether any enemy troops were in the village. The account of the action which followed is told in the words of the platoon commander:

“My scouts returned and reported that Pipipaia and the area beyond for 400 yards, up to a small hill, were clear of Japanese.

“I then moved the platoon through the village and slowly on down the trail, which followed a gradual slope for about 400 yards. This area, once planted in gardens, had plenty of brush and tall grass for cover. From there the trail led down a steep hill and onto a flat area which stretched for about 300 yards. There was plenty of cover on either side of the narrow trail, so the platoon headquarters moved down the hill behind

the point squad; the remaining two squads moved about 30 yards behind.

"The scouts had now moved about 150 yards along the flat area and were dispersing to the left and right side of the trail when a Jap sniper fired two shots from a tree. At the same time another sniper fired from a tree on the immediate right of myself and the platoon headquarters.

"The platoon immediately dived into cover and crawled into observation posts. The point squad and scouts observed two Jap snipers up two trees, and a third sniper who was a native Jap spy. The point squad immediately engaged these targets and killed all three snipers. Two fell out of the trees, but the third was tied to the tree.

"I then observed that we were now opposite a large Japanese bivouac area, which the scouts had not observed, or reported. The shooting of the first two Japs and the native alarmed the enemy who started moving out of the bivouac area.

"My platoon was now situated in a very good position, having crawled into good observation points overlooking the area where the Japs were. I then ordered the point squad to engage all targets as Japs were running in wild confusion. Some moved toward trees where there were sniper posts. I saw at least five Japs shot down while they were climbing trees, and I saw two shot in the same tree. Fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired, I had observed about 10 Japs shot by the point squad.

"I then moved back to my other two squads in order to get a better observation and appreciation of the situation. After reaching the second and third squads, which the sergeant had dispersed well in good positions for engaging targets which were still presenting themselves, I decided that it was not necessary at this point to advance forward or around any of the flanks. I ordered the whole platoon to keep engaging targets. Two Jap light machine guns then opened up, but a Bren gun from my squad quickly silenced them. Both were firing from the side of the trail under very little cover.

"At this moment I ordered the platoon to cease fire and observe. The Japs, apparently thinking that our force was retiring, began running out of cover, supposedly to better positions. My platoon then opened up again for about a further 15 minutes. One Bren gun also began peppering a large bivouac area, and hut, from which most of the Japs had come. It could not be ascertained what casualties, if any, were inflicted in this hut, but some Japs had looked out and had run back in.

"At this stage of the engagement, Jap voices could be heard calling out at points which seemed to stretch right back to the beach (estimated to be about 1 mile away). Jap rifles and machines guns (light) began shooting about half a mile to the left. Also some shooting was heard in the bushes on the right. None of my soldiers was in either of these areas.

“Two large shells, apparently from large mortars believed sited on a hill about 600 yards back from the Jap bivouac area, landed on a point about 300 yards behind my positions. Then more shells landed behind me, but they were not as accurate as the first and landed in the bushes. The first two shells had made direct hits on the trail down which I had advanced. It was then that I decided to withdraw my platoon back to Pipipaia, and establish an ambush there for possible enemy patrols coming forward.

“The platoon withdrew by squads, one crossing the other. There was very little firing coming from the enemy where the engagement had taken place, but there was still a large amount of firing coming from areas in the bushes about 600 yards out to the left and to the right.

“When I established my ambush at Pipipaia, I immediately got my noncoms together to check for casualties and, if possible, to estimate the number of enemy casualties.

“There were no casualties in my platoon. The estimate of Jap casualties was 47 plus three native scouts who were working for the enemy. This was a very conservative estimate, taking into account only those Japs shot by individual soldiers and not including any casualties inflicted by grenades thrown into the bivouacs.

“After the check was made, two more mortar shells were fired at us, but these did not explode. They were fired about 20 minutes after we had withdrawn, and

there were no enemy patrols coming forward. We then decided to withdraw onto the hill and post an ambush there.

“We remained there till 1730, approximately 3 hours after the engagement, but no Japs came forward.

“We then decided to withdraw to our former bivouac area, go into a defensive position, and await any possible Jap movement forward. We remained there till 1200 on 2 February. Seeing no signs of Jap patrols up to this time, we then moved back to camp again, arriving at 1530 hours.”

Section IV. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON ENEMY BOOBY TRAPS

1. INTRODUCTION

These supplemental notes on Japanese booby traps deal with six improvised types found in the South Pacific and on Kiska Island. For a more complete study of enemy booby traps, reference should be made to the introduction of "Two Booby Traps Devised by Japanese," *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 8, page 63.

Practically all of the comparatively few Japanese booby traps found to date have been improvised, and many of them have been crudely conceived. In all cases of actual booby traps found on Kiska, the cords and wires used were not concealed.

2. IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

a. Grenade-discharger Shell and Grenade

This type of improvised Japanese booby trap, found in New Guinea, consists of a Model 97 hand grenade and a Model 89 grenade-discharger shell, wired together with the percussion fuze of the shell resting on the base of the grenade and the grenade fuze pointing downward. Apparently it works on the same principle as the enemy tube booby trap (*Intelligence Bulletin*,

Vol II, No. 8, pp. 64-67). The grenade-discharger shell apparently was added to the grenade to increase the effect (see fig. 5). However, it is doubtful if the detonation of the grenade would cause detonation of the shell. The whole idea probably was conceived by personnel inexperienced in the technical makeup and effectiveness of explosives.




Figure 5.—Japanese Booby Trap (combining grenade-discharger shell and grenade).

The grenade-discharger shell and hand grenade booby-trap combination is designed to utilize a cartridge case, or some sort of tube, as described for the tube booby trap, although no tube is shown in fig. 5. The suspension string for the booby-trap assembly apparently hangs on a suspension wire at the top of the tube or cartridge case, similar to the tube booby-trap arrangement. A trip wire is attached to the suspension wire.

Before operation of this booby trap, it is necessary to pull out the safety wire in the fuze of each weapon. Then the application of sufficient pressure against the trip wire pulls out the suspension wire and allows the entire assembly to fall, with the grenade striker hitting a hard surface. Explosion of the grenade depresses the fuze striker on the grenade-discharger shell and, theoretically, causes detonation.

The delay train (4 to 5 seconds) was not removed from the grenade which was used in the booby trap found in New Guinea.

If necessary to neutralize this type of booby trap, carefully replace the safety wires.

b. General-purpose Bombs

The Japanese utilized 30- and 50-kilogram general-purpose bombs at two places on New Georgia Island. These bombs were buried in vertical positions at probable landing points on beaches. The nose of each bomb pointed upward, and contained armed fuzes. Each of

the latter was covered with a board, which in turn was covered with a light layer of sand.

3. ON KISKA

a. Piece of Bamboo

This booby trap was constructed as follows: A piece of bamboo was sawed out to give a clothes-pin effect (see fig. 6). Single wires were run along the outer edges and taped securely. Nut and bolt contacts were screwed into the ends. Very slight pressure was required to make contact. The wires ran from contact to a dry-cell battery and on to a charge of explosive. In one instance this consisted of two *sake* (rice beer) bottles filled with loose picric acid and placed inside a 120-mm shell case. In another instance the explosive consisted of a metal-covered block of picric acid weighing $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 pounds. Electric blasting caps were used as initiators to set off the charges.

Two of these booby traps were found—both under boards at the entrance to caves. Little attempt was made to conceal the wiring.




Figure 6.—Japanese Booby Trap (using piece of bamboo).

b. Phonograph

In booby-trapping a phonograph, the Japanese arranged an electrical contact on the pick-up assembly in such a manner that moving of the phonograph arm to play a record (approx. $\frac{1}{2}$ inch at contact point) would connect the current and set off a charge. Both the charge and battery were under floor boards. No attempt was made to conceal wires leading from the phonograph to the charge. (See fig. 7.)




Figure 7.—Japanese Booby Trap (utilizing a phonograph).

c. Radio

In utilizing a radio for a booby trap, the Japanese removed all except one battery and filled the cavity with explosive blocks of picric acid. Electrical contact

wires went from the switch to the battery and to the charge.

d. Antitank Mines

Figure 8 shows how the Japanese booby-trapped a 75-mm field gun (Model 41) by using four Model 93 antitank mines. A mine was placed in front of, and behind, each wheel; under each mine, six blocks of picric acid were placed. The whole was covered neatly with earth.




Figure 8.—Japanese Booby Trap (using land mines and picric acid blocks).

4. IN BURMA

a. General

In a recent engagement in Burma, the Japanese used booby traps on a large scale for the first time. The enemy attempted to block off the approach to a center of resistance by booby-trapping a jungle-covered area 100 yards wide and 200 yards long, on a high and narrow mountain ridge. Within this area more than 100 booby traps had been laid.

The booby traps were all made with British No. 36 grenades, and were extremely simple in principle. The grenade was booby-trapped in two ways:

b. "Tin-can" Method

Figure 9a shows how part of the side of a tin can is cut to make it adaptable for use as a booby-trap




Figure 9.—Japanese Booby Traps (a. utilizing a tin can and British No. 36 hand grenade; b. using tree fork and grenade).

mechanism, and how the grenade is placed in the can. One end and a portion of the side of the can are cut away, and a hole is punched in the remaining end of the can for the purpose of attaching a trip wire inside.

In preparing the grenade for booby-trapping, the Japanese remove the safety pin, but hold the release handle down so that the grenade will not fire. Then they insert the grenade into the cut-out tin can so that the release handle is held inside the remaining circular portion of the can. Holding the can and grenade together, the enemy places them on the ground. The grenade functions when a pull on the trip wire draws the can away from the grenade and thereby allows the release handle to fly up. (Since the grenade is relatively heavy, it remains in place.)

As a variation of the "tin-can" method, the Japanese place the grenade in the can as outlined above, and then balance the can on a tree limb. When pressure is exerted on the trip wire, the can falls over, the grenade drops out (releasing the handle), and the grenade detonates.

c. "Tree-fork" Method

The "tree-fork" method works on the same principle as the variation of the "tin-can" method, just described (see fig. 9b). The space between the tree limbs serves the same function as the can. When the trip wire is pulled, the grenade falls out of the tree and explodes.

d. Trip Wires

The trip wires used in rigging the Japanese booby traps were strung loose in the heavy undergrowth, and were frequently attached to long vines and creepers. The enemy used ordinary telephone cable for trip wire, and made no attempt to camouflage either the wires or the grenades—other than the concealment afforded by the dense vegetation.

Section V. JAPANESE NIGHT ATTACKS

1. INTRODUCTION

Night attacks have been stressed by the Japanese. These are more likely to come at a time when the enemy's tactical situation is desperate, or when it is very favorable; however, such attacks may be anticipated at any time.

A Japanese treatise which gives some night-attack tactics not previously disseminated is presented below. In connection with this article, reference should be made to "Small-unit Tactics Used by Japanese at Night" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 64-72).

2. THE TREATISE

All officers who will be engaged in the operations carry out a thorough reconnaissance during the afternoon of the night preceding the attack. From commanding ground or edge of a woods, they make a thorough study of the terrain, and lay out the plan of attack. The attack is ordered to follow well-defined terrain features which permit easy control and maintenance of direction in approaching hostile positions.

After dark, a reconnaissance patrol, consisting of three to five men under an officer or a clever sergeant major, is sent out to reconnoiter the routes of advance, mark the turns with bits of paper or white cloth, and determine the disposition of hostile troops. This reconnaissance is carried out as stealthily as possible to maintain surprise. While this reconnaissance is

going on, the attack units are moved forward of the Japanese main line into an advanced position from which previously selected routes of advance can be found easily. Generally, machine guns are not carried; firing is avoided, and reliance is placed upon the bayonet.

Initially, a night attack aims at hitting both flanks of a position at the same time. After the hostile flanks have been rolled back, the two attacking prongs continue on beyond and behind the hostile front lines and meet at a prearranged rendezvous point. The direction of attack of these two elements of the attacking force is generally at an angle to the opposing front line so they can meet. After effecting the rendezvous, the attacking forces reorganize, and launch another attack against the center of the hostile line, from the rear. If the attacking force is to seize and to hold the enemy's position, they dig in to await a counterattack. If the unit which sent out an attacking force is on the defensive, the attacking force retires to its own lines after inflicting as much damage as possible upon the opposing forces.

Squads assemble in one or two columns with each man close behind the man ahead. All elements of the attacking force try to maintain visual contact with adjacent units. Security to the front, rear, and flanks is sent out. These security elements also maintain visual contact with the main body. Security elements to the front of a platoon normally consist of an officer and two or three men. Individual soldiers provide flank and rear security.

Section VI. HOW THE JAPANESE MARK TRAILS FOR NIGHT USE

1. INTRODUCTION

To facilitate night movements in the jungle, the Japanese have made frequent use of phosphorescent wood, vines, and ropes. The phosphorescent wood and vines are plentiful in the jungles, while individual enemy soldiers usually carry a length of rope for a variety of purposes. How the Japanese use such material to aid their movements at night is explained in the enemy instructions given below.

2. THE INSTRUCTIONS

a. Materials for marking should be prepared during the daytime; however, luminous wooden markers will be prepared the night before.

b. The various types of route-marking materials are luminous wooden markers, vines, and ropes.

c. If luminous wooden markers are used, they should be placed higher than a man's head; if vines and ropes are used, they should be placed hip high.

d. Steep cliffs, holes, and other places of danger should be blocked off with vines and ropes, and also marked by luminous wooden markers.

e. Luminous wooden markers should always be tied to a tree. However, instead of being tied to a large tree, they can be

inserted between the thick vines, and so forth that surround the tree.

f. When the luminous wooden marker dries on account of the sun, the degree of illumination will decrease; therefore, it is necessary either to place it on moist ground during the daytime or dip it in water in the evening.

Section VII. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON JAPANESE CAMOUFLAGE

1. GENERAL

The information given in this section is largely supplemental to data carried in previous issues on Japanese camouflage (see "Camouflage Notes," *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II. No. 7, pp. 47-50).

Particularly in the jungle areas of the South Pacific, the Japanese have made excellent use of natural means to camouflage positions, weapons, equipment, and personnel. "Natural materials," states a Japanese source, "are always used, and are complemented by artificial materials only when necessary."

2. ACCORDING TO JAPANESE SOURCES

The following notes on Japanese camouflage are paraphrased from enemy sources:

a. Nets

Camouflage nets are made with small string and wire, into which natural materials (such as Hera leaves and the inner bark of the Shinanoki tree) are interwoven.

The size of the mesh in the net depends on the material to be attached. In a net to which Hera leaves are attached, the mesh usually is $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches in diameter.

Before attaching Hera leaves, string nets are immersed in astringent dyes, and wire nets are oxidized [heated in a fire] to eliminate gloss.

b. Screens

Screens used for camouflage purposes are of two types, portable and stationary. Portable screens usually are used for concealing personnel. They are made of light material, and therefore are easy to carry and to erect (see fig. 10). Such screens are generally covered with grass and nets.

c. Turf

Turf is used mainly for camouflaging earthworks. It must be placed on the required surface so that it resembles natural grass in every respect. The roots are buried well into the earth, and the spaces between are filled with loose soil.

When the season and time permit, sow seeds of fast-growing grass or legumes on the earthworks.




Figure 10.—Japanese Portable Camouflage Screen.

As far as possible, use only the turf taken from the earth where the position is located. In any case, seek grass of the same variety, density, shape, and height as the grass growing near the camouflaged position.

In order to avoid bending or breaking the stems and blades of grass in turf that has been collected, do not pile the blocks of turf on top of each other.

d. Coloring Materials

Paints and dyes are used as coloring materials. Paints are employed as often as possible in combination with other camouflage agents.

Tents made of coarse hemp or thick cotton cloth may, if necessary, be dyed or painted.

3. AS SEEN ON MAKIN ISLAND

a. Natural Cover

On Makin Island, the Japanese depended mainly on the thick natural cover of coconut trees and other vegetation for camouflage. This cover, used frequently in combination with transplantings, was employed to camouflage all defensive installations. For example, the enemy constructed a concrete pillbox under the fronds of a small palm tree, and placed turf on top of the structure and small pandanus trees around it.

The Japanese employed the same method in concealing beach defenses. They constructed rifle pits and machine-gun emplacements directly behind the beach under the fringe of coconut trees along the shore, and left intact the low undergrowth in front of the positions (see fig. 11).



Figure 11.—Japanese Camouflage (showing use of natural cover on Makin beach).

Some of the new buildings were being constructed with large breadfruit trees growing within them (see fig. 12). The trees were not a part of the structure of the buildings, but were pruned, when necessary, so that their growth would continue unhampered. Such camouflage also provides shade for the buildings.

b. Cut Palm Fronds

The Japanese also extensively utilized cut palm fronds for camouflage on Makin. These were spread

over movable stores or new installations so that the covering blended with the surroundings. All oil-drum storage dumps were concealed in this manner (see fig. 13). In most cases, this method was advantageously combined with tree cover.

The Japanese also placed palm fronds on the roofs of a number of buildings, to conceal them and to protect the corrugated iron roofs from the direct rays of the sun.

The enemy placed palm-frond roofs on small build-



Figure 12.—Japanese Camouflage (showing use of growing tree to conceal building on Makin).




Figure 13.—Japanese Camouflage (showing use of cut palm fronds).

ings, either to conceal them from air observation or to make them resemble native structures.

c. Deceptive Painting

Deceptive painting, in various tones of red and gray, was also used on the roofs of some buildings to make them blend into the foliage. Many of the European-style buildings, constructed by the British before the Japanese occupation, were disruptively painted in this manner. Stripes, of greatly varying width, were usually painted roughly parallel to the length of the build-

ing. In cases where this type of painting was used, no palm fronds were placed on the roofs of the buildings.

All of the heavy guns on the island were disruptively painted with red, yellow, green, and blue colors.

d. Dummy Installations

Five dummy guns were found on the island. Three of these, on the west coast, were designed to resemble coast-defense guns. They were placed so that they "guarded" the best stretch of landing beach on the west side of the island.



Figure 14.—Japanese Dummy Gun Position (Makin).

The gun barrels consisted of coconut logs with burlap wrapped around the "muzzles." The mounts were also made of coconut logs, and were effectively wrapped with burlap. The three guns on the west coast were built in coral-stone revetments while the other two, on the southern shore of Ukiangong Point, were placed in positions constructed of coconut logs, which projected from 1 to 3½ feet out of the ground (see fig. 14).

Section VIII. SOME JAPANESE RUSES

1. INTRODUCTION

U. S. forces in combat against the Japanese have learned that it pays to be always on the alert against enemy ruses or tricks. Although the Japanese have used such tactics in numerous instances, they have been successful in only a relatively few cases. Frequently enemy ruses have been employed to make up for a lack of combat efficiency against U. S. troops. Certainly such tactics do not afford the Japanese any "super" advantages. It's a game that can be played by both sides, and our troops have quite often played it successfully against opposing forces.

2. EXAMPLES OF RUSES

a. Sandwiching in a few words of English occasionally, a group of Japanese screamed and yelled to give the impression that U. S. soldiers were being tortured. The idea was to attract U. S. troops to the scene for the purpose of mowing them down by enemy fire.

b. In two instances on the Burma front, the Japanese cut British telephone lines and then attempted to hide the breaks by binding the cut ends with insulating tape. The idea was to make it very difficult for line repair men to find where the wire had been cut.

c. On Betio Island, some Japanese pulled the old trick of playing dead. U. S. troops were on the alert, however, and little or no damage resulted from such tactics.

Section IX. JAPANESE EXPLANATION OF "DUTY" AND "SPIRIT"

1. INTRODUCTION

To acquaint U. S. troops as much as possible with their Japanese foes, the *Intelligence Bulletin* has included in previous issues a number of articles dealing with characteristics of the individual enemy soldier, his reaction in combat, and the factors of his environment that make him different from the average U. S. soldier. For a complete reference to these articles, see the introduction to "Japanese Characteristics and Reaction in Battle" (Vol. II, No. 8, p. 69).

In connection with the general subject above, a "morale lecture" by a Japanese lieutenant is reproduced in part below. This lecture, apparently very carefully prepared, gives a clear picture of Japanese thought on the subject of "duty" and "spirit" as it relates to combat in the present war. The lecture apparently was written before mid-1943.

It is believed that this lecture may be of particular value to officers in the preparation of orientation talks on enemy attitudes and psychology.

2. THE LECTURE

When we fight, we win. When we attack, we capture. The

results of our recent glorious battles are acknowledged by all. What induces these admirable military accomplishments? America, England, and China, whose natural resources, physical strength, and equipment are not inferior to ours, were routed miserably in battles with the Imperial Army. So we must assume that for some reason they have defects. If so, what are these defects?

Fundamentally, America and England are countries which traditionally value individualism. It is known from American and English literature and orations that the people regard the state as an assembly of individuals. Accordingly, the individual is of supreme importance and the state secondary. Thus, it is quite understandable that there is no disgrace in the individual sacrificing everything to save his life when endangered.

China is a country dominated by the family system. From ancient times the traditions of a perennial family have been observed and respected, but the people have little interest in changes in the constitution of the country. Their past history reveals 20 changes of dynasties. Among them were families, but nothing higher. With the Han, Tang, Sung, Ming, and Manchu dynasties, the country passed through different eras, but there was very little historical record of any spirit among the people with these changes. The Chinese still observe the family system, as of old. . . .

Then, what about Japan? It is a known fact that Japan is not an individualistic country. Nor is it a country of family systems. In Japan the family is stressed; blood ties are highly regarded, and ancestors are worshipped more than in China. But there is much more than this in Japan. There is the Imperial Family, unique in this world, that is over us. The Imperial Family is the light, the life, the pride of Japan. In truth, Japan is Japan and the Japanese are Japanese because of the Imperial Family. From this consciousness the Japanese spirit is born. A loyalty is born, which utterly disregards the safety of the home and family—even one's own life—for the

welfare of the Emperor and country. This special Japanese spirit is something peculiarly Japanese, quite different from anything American, English, or Chinese. When setting out to do things, we who possess this special Japanese spirit can accomplish our duty; but those who do not have it, perform only a superficial duty. . . .

Our great air raid on Pearl Harbor was an attack that satisfied our soldierly spirit, which stops at nothing short of total destruction. It affords an affirmative answer to whether this magnificent achievement was right or not. . . .

In our Imperial Army, we have graciously been permitted to witness and hear many loyal speeches, many instances rich in Japanese spirit, and many actions carried out with enthusiasm and power.

In times of peace when there was no danger of attack or fighting the enemy, officers and men, covered with dirt and sweat, silently and enthusiastically carried on their training, never relaxing their efforts for a moment. We could see all this for ourselves. This ardent peace-time training could not have continued if there were not the strong resolution to repay the Emperor's trust by acting as the bulwark of the Empire in time of emergency, and by taking the safety and dangers of the country on our shoulders. We thus assured the security of the state and fulfilled our duty as soldiers.

When we stop and reflect on those who have carried out their duties in the past, we find that they always discharged them with full determination and with the Japanese spirit. In this lies the strength of Japan.

Happily our forefathers have repaid the trust of His Majesty, the Emperor, by preserving tradition and discharging their duty in this way. We must not in the least defile the shining tradition bequeathed to us by them. On the contrary, for Emperor and country we must do all we can to add to its luster.

It is obvious that the road before us is not easy. We need

strong determination to establish the New Order in Greater East Asia. Governors and governed must unite purposes and push ahead fearlessly with a single object in mind. Here I want to raise my voice and declare: "Carry out your duty with the Japanese spirit."

The spirit of Bushido has been spoken of from olden times in these words: "Among flowers, the cherry; among men, the warrior." With this spirit hold your ground without yielding a step, no matter what wounds you may receive, and thus make your end glorious by carrying out your duty calmly.

Section X. JAPANESE ARMY RATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

Japanese Army rations have been found to be entirely edible, and ordinarily may be utilized by U. S. forces as supplementary rations when captured. If at all possible, such rations should be examined by a medical officer before being used.

Observers (including high-ranking combat officers) recommend that U. S. troop leaders be informed about the more common Japanese foods before going into battle, so that our troops may utilize captured enemy rations if they are needed. Under other conditions, an enterprising mess sergeant may often break the monotony of his unit's diet, and add to it an unusual touch, by employing some of the less common Japanese foods. He can also use the ever-present rice as a staple when it is captured in quantity.

2. STANDARD RATIONS¹

Contrary to the belief of some persons, the Japanese soldier does not live entirely on rice. To him, rice is a staple food, just as bread is to us; and, if he had only rice for his meal, he would be as displeased as we would be with only bread to eat. However, rice does constitute well over 50 percent of the Japanese soldier's diet.

¹ In connection with this section, reference should be made to a previous *Intelligence Bulletin* article, "Japanese Food" (Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 77-79).

Both polished and unpolished rice has been captured from the enemy. Polished rice is more common, probably because it can be preserved longer than unpolished rice. To increase the palatability of rice, the Japanese usually season it with a soy-bean sauce (*shoyu*) or *miso* paste, which is made of fermented soy beans and which is more commonly used for preparing soup.

U. S. rations weigh more and have a higher calorific value than the Japanese.

Although the Japanese have standard rations, they supplement these whenever possible with various foods obtained locally—even when standard rations are easily available. There have been many instances during the warfare in Pacific theaters when the enemy has run extremely low on rations, due to loss of shipping and successful United Nations attacks against the Japanese land forces.

As a general rule, the Japanese field ration in the South Pacific theaters of operations has not been standardized, but has varied from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ pounds per man per day. Theoretically, the field ration is approximately 1.5 kilograms (3.3 lbs.). Two types of specially packed field rations, "A" and "B," have been noted frequently. The "A" ration normally consists of 30.7 ounces of rice, 5.3 ounces of meat or fish, and a small amount of seasoning and flavoring. The "B" ration normally consists of 24.4 ounces of hard biscuits in three paper bags (enough for three meals), 2.1 ounces of meat or fish, and a small amount of seasoning (salt and sugar).

In New Guinea (June, 1943) a Japanese table of ration allowances listed three separate categories of issue:

Basic: 1.3 Kilograms (when transportation is adequate)

"A": 1.13 Kilograms (when transportation is difficult)

"B": .86½ Kilogram (when transportation is very difficult)

Under the "A" ration, sweet potatoes, fresh vegetables, bananas, and papayas were to supplement deficiencies to the extent of .85 kilogram (524 calories), while under the "B" issue these local foods were to provide 1.8 kilograms (1,218 calories).

It is known that the Japanese use vitamin pills quite frequently as a part of their rations. Vitamin B is supplied in three forms: (1) tablets, (2) as a liquid, and (3) a tube of paste.

A "Polished Rice Combination Case" captured by U. S. forces on Bougainville Island contained 40 "portions" (mostly rice). The contents were packed loose in an air-tight tin case enclosed in a wooden crate. A single portion was calculated to include the following:

10½ oz. of polished rice

½ oz. of dehydrated *Miso* paste

Vitamin B supplementary food

Vitamins A and D tablets

Powdered tea (to supply vitamin C)

A portion of fuel and matches.

Small extra amounts of all items were included so that the rations could be stretched or slightly increased. The fuel was in 3-ounce cans, one can being intended to cook two portions of rice.

The daily ration per man for the Japanese garrison on Kolombangara from April to July, 1943, was approximately as follows:

Polished rice	1 lb. 7 oz.
Canned goods	2.8 oz.
Dehydrated food	2.8 oz.
Sugar7 oz.
Salt35 oz.
Pickles5 oz.
Soy-bean sauce07 pint

The garrison commander on Kolombangara in May issued an order which read: "Burdock, chopped seaweed, white kidney beans, sweet potatoes, and dried gourd shavings will be issued as dehydrated food. Canned goods will be issued mainly from broken boxes in order to get rid of the goods in the broken boxes. Since the fixed quantity of powdered soy-bean sauce and sugar is not available, they will be distributed proportionately from goods on hand."

Emergency air-crew rations found recently in a wrecked Japanese plane (New Guinea) included 20 ounces of unpolished rice and the following other items: puffed wheat, biscuits, a dried fish, two small bottles of concentrated wine (35 percent alcohol), some candy wrapped in colored cellophane, large salt tablets, and a portable water-purifying set. These items were divided among five transparent, water-proof bags.

Probably the most common type of Japanese canned food found to date in the South Pacific is compressed fish (principally salmon and bonito), which may some-

times require soaking and salting to make it palatable. Other items of Japanese food found included: pickled plums, dehydrated vegetables (beans, peas, cabbage, horseradish, burdock, seaweed), compressed barley cakes, rice cakes, canned oranges and tangerines, *sake* (rice beer), powdered tea leaves, slices of ginger, salted plum cake, canned beef, cooked whale meat, confections, and vitamin tablets.

On Makin Island, stored food found by U. S. troops consisted largely of rice, which was contained in heavy, woven rice-straw bags. It is interesting to note that after the bags were emptied they were filled with sand and used to protect underground shelters, defensive positions, and so forth. In addition to rice, our troops found considerable stores of canned fish (mostly salmon and sardines), meat, vegetables, fruit, and milk.

3. SUPPLEMENTARY RATIONS

The Japanese use a variety of methods to obtain supplementary rations, or food to meet emergencies. These methods include gardening, fishing (sometimes by use of dynamite), dealing with natives, and foraging by individuals and small groups.

The Japanese soldier has a fondness for sweets, which he usually gets in "comfort bags" sent from home. He also is issued sweets at certain times, along with a ration of *sake*. Such issues are usually made to coincide with a Japanese national festival or holiday.²

² See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 3, for a list of Japanese festivals and holidays.

4. FOOD CONTAINERS

The packaging of Japanese rations has been varied and inconsistent. During the earlier stages of the South Pacific operations, the enemy lost a great deal of rice and dried food because these were improperly packed for tropical conditions.

To float rations ashore from ships or submarines, the Japanese have used 50-gallon drums, each of which held 120 rations, or enough for one company for one day. On top of each drum was a hole, 2 inches in diameter, which was closed by a water-tight screw cap while the drum was being floated to shore.

The Japanese (in New Guinea) also employed water-tight rubber containers, inclosed within water-proof canvas bags, to float food to shore. Each container accommodated about 130 pounds of rations. One full container was considered sufficient to supply one man with food for one month.

On Bougainville Island the rations for a Japanese landing force were carried in air-tight tin cases which were packed tightly into wooden crates (see par. 2, "Standard Rations").

The Japanese have frequently used sections of bamboo and burlap bags to pack food. For food drops by parachute, the enemy has employed 120-pound cardboard containers. A single light bomber is able to drop six of these containers per trip.

PART TWO: GERMANY

Section I. GERMAN FIELD DEFENSES OBSERVED IN ITALY

The German deliberate field fortifications¹ illustrated in this section are typical of many that U. S. troops are now encountering in Italy. An article in a previous issue of the *Intelligence Bulletin*, "A Prepared Defensive Position in Italy" (Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 57-60), discussed in some detail a number of German field fortifications of the types illustrated here, and may profitably be read in connection with the following material.

A German machine-gun position, which has received a direct hit by hostile artillery, is shown in figure 15. Coils of wire had been used as revetment, and to hold the camouflage in place. This position had a narrow mine and trip-wire belt to the front. The entrance to the position was from the rear (see fig. 16). The zig-zagged approach trench was shaded by low trees. It will be noted that, in addition to providing thick overhead cover, the Germans used an abundance of natural material in the camouflage scheme.

The entrance to a German dugout used for sleeping

¹"A hasty field fortification is one made quickly, when under fire or threat of immediate attack. A deliberate field fortification is made more slowly and carefully, when not in contact with the enemy."—TM 20-205.



Figure 15.—German Machine-gun Position (front view).

quarters is illustrated in figure 17. Tree shade was used to supplement the natural material with which the revetted dugout has been camouflaged. The debris scattered in the foreground is of course not characteristic of a German position in actual use. The enemy takes pains to hide discarded material of all kinds, even including such minor items as stray pieces of paper, so as not to attract hostile air observation. The Germans are well aware that a single gleaming bit of steel or a fragment of paper may reflect enough light to attract the attention of an air observer.



Figure 16.—German Machine-gun Position (rear entrance).

When the Germans prepare dugouts in hillsides and cliffs, they take every advantage of opportunities to secure ample overhead cover. A two-room dugout used as living quarters by the enemy is illustrated in figure 18. This dugout has more than 10 feet of overhead cover.

The large dugouts illustrated in figures 19 and 20 were constructed and occupied by the enemy in the vicinity of Le Cave.² The Germans use dugouts of this type for many different purposes—as living quarters,

² The equipment shown in figure 19 is our own.

vehicle shelters, command posts, and ammunition and supply dumps. The dugout shown in figure 20 was used as living quarters.

Experience has shown that the Germans are very likely to mine field fortifications of the types illustrated here before abandoning them.



Figure 17.—Entrance to German Dugout in Rolling Terrain.



Figure 18.—Entrance to German Two-room Dugout in a Hillside.



Figure 19.—German Dugout in the Side of a Cliff (used for storing supplies).




Figure 20.—Another German Dugout in the Side of a Cliff (used as living quarters).

Section II. COMMANDERS, OBSERVERS DISCUSS ENEMY TACTICS

The following comments on German combat methods in Italy have been made by U. S. Army unit commanders and experienced observers. Only those tactics which have been noted repeatedly are mentioned here, since occasional, isolated instances of German methods cannot be regarded as illustrative of standard enemy procedure.

When the Germans suspect that new troops are opposing them, enemy patrols become very active, to determine the identity and strength of the new troops.

The Germans have used artillery and some rocket guns to harass our forward areas and to interdict vital supply roads, but fire has decreased as soon as the enemy has lost dominant observation.

The enemy often restricts his movements entirely to those he can make under cover of darkness or during days when weather makes hostile air activity impossible. . . . The Germans do not pull out in daylight, even when they have practically been surrounded. They fight like tigers to hold a narrow escape corridor, through which they try to withdraw at night.

Enemy agents make every effort to infiltrate into civilian traffic and movement.

Long-range weapons are active mainly on clear days. No change has been noted in the German policy of continually changing positions and of employing a considerable number of single guns.

It is necessary to stress again and again that road craters are surrounded and lined with antipersonnel mines—often just over the lip of the crater, where they are harder to detect. The Germans have used a large number of abatis in Italy, most of which have been infested with antipersonnel devices.

During the first part of December, the German artillery had the commanding observation, and, as we advanced, the enemy's activity was definitely in proportion to the visibility and observation advantages remaining in his hands. The enemy adjusted by observation the major portion of his artillery fire. Subsequent night harassing missions (German) were based on this data. German counterbattery fire decreased considerably whenever the advance of friendly troops deprived the enemy of commanding heights. . . . The Germans are continuing the policy of seeking to neutralize an installation temporarily, rather than exploiting opportunities for damage when an increased use of ammunition would be involved. Fire of medium caliber has been decreasing, with a corresponding increase in light caliber, principally 105-mm guns.

The Germans will send out patrols to feign a night attack, or a daylight attack, just to locate your barrages so that they can side-step them when the real attack comes.

The German positions we have run into in the mountains have had very few riflemen in the front line. The forward element of the defense has consisted almost entirely of machine guns in rock bunkers; these bunkers are so cleverly blended into the terrain that they are extremely difficult to locate. In

the daytime the Germans seem to hold practically all their riflemen back about 200 yards. They depend on their machine guns, mortars, and artillery to stop your attack or to cause you such losses that a quick counterattack by the riflemen will throw you out. At night they put out listening posts manned by riflemen, but still hold back most of the riflemen.

On Hill 769 one of our companies got up close to the German bunkers. The company could not move in daylight because of the lack of cover, so a night attack was decided upon. Since there would be moonlight, it was decided to place smoke on the bunkers at the time of attack. This was done, but, as soon as the smoke screen was formed, the Germans left their bunkers, moved their right front and left front to the edge of the smoke screen nearest our positions, and placed machine-pistol fire on our attacking unit's flank.

The outstanding feature of mountainous country in Italy is that a village is almost invariably on the dominating ground, or on ground vital to the attacker to secure his line of communication. Such villages consist of closely packed houses with narrow streets between them. The houses themselves have thick walls and are immune to shellfire, except in the case of a direct hit. The enemy realizes this and makes full use of them as strong points, firing from windows and improvised loopholes. Such villages are also covered by machine-gun and mortar fire from either flank. In some cases houses are scattered on dominating features, and the enemy often uses them as machine-gun posts, covering the approaches by means of snipers and additional machine guns in adjacent houses.

In front of organized German positions, we have found mines only in the natural avenues of approach. These avenues are also covered with machine-gun and mortar fire. Thus the Germans are better prepared to deal with an opposing force

using draws or gullies than one which is working its way along the sides of ridges. On the ridges and less jagged mountains, the Germans often dispose their strength on the reverse slopes in order to bring heavy fire on our forces as they cross over the crests.

Strong stone bunkers are continually being encountered in mountainous terrain. Although it is reported that grenades and rockets will not penetrate the walls of such bunkers, it has been found that both grenades and rockets are effective when exploded close to the slits, which are near ground level. The occupants are at least stunned. As a U. S. sergeant who has had considerable experience with both weapons recently expressed it, "If you close in fast after using them on bunkers, you will find the Germans either knocked cold or goofy." Another noncom observes, "Grenades exploding within 3 feet or so of the slit will get the Germans if they are looking out."

In town fighting, buildings and strong points occupied by the Germans have proved vulnerable both to the grenade and rocket launcher.

The German soldier does not like to fight at night, and does not fight as well at night as he does during the day. In several instances German security at night has been found to be lacking. A number of instances have also shown that the German soldier, when surprised at night, has become confused and has been an easy victim of an opponent well trained in night fighting.

When patrols are sent out to locate the German defensive positions,¹ the Germans do not fire on these patrols if they can avoid it, but let them go on through. German prisoners have stated that they were ordered not to fire except in case of a

¹ This commander is speaking of heavy stone bunkers.

major attack. They have also recited instances of seeing our patrols go by their positions at a given time on a certain night. Checking back, we have found that our patrols were there at the stated time.

On the other hand, if one of our patrols stumbles into a German position, the Germans try to destroy the patrol to the last man, to keep the information from getting back to our units.

Repeatedly, when an entire patrol has returned to report that a hill is unoccupied or that a bridge has not been blown, some unit moves forward and finds the hill alive with Germans, who smother the unit with fire from machine pistols, light machine guns, and mortars—or, in the case of a bridge, the unit will find that the Germans have demolished it in the meantime. In other words, the Germans are quick to exploit the situation if an opposing force fails to seize and hold ground until stronger elements have been brought up to hold it in force.

Experience has shown that the Germans will almost invariably launch a counterattack to break up an attack made by small infantry units. You can expect such a counterattack, usually by 10 to 20 men, not more than 5 minutes after you get close to the German positions. They are usually well armed with light machine guns and machine pistols, and counter-attack by fire and movement. They keep up a heavy fire while small details, even individuals, alternately push forward. The Germans almost always attack your flank. They seldom close in with the bayonet, but try to drive you out by fire. . . .

The Germans keep a sharp lookout for radio antennas, and shell every one they see.

The enemy is skillful at radio intercept, and tries to draw a great deal of information by inference. He notes the peculiarities of individual radio operators, which can easily become a dead give-away to the location of units.

Section III. GERMAN MINE WARFARE AND BOOBY TRAPS (ITALY)

1. GENERAL

The terrain fought over in Italy has been especially well suited to the employment of mines as delaying and casualty weapons. The limited road net; the mountainous, close country, with few trails and secondary roads; the terrain conformation and nature of available approaches to objectives; and the numerous bridge sites and by-passes—all these have all presented good opportunities for the employment of various types of mines. The element of rapid withdrawal and pursuit which characterized the fighting in Sicily has not been present in the Italian Campaign thus far. For this reason the laying of mines and the preparation of booby traps has not been hurried. It has been deliberate, thorough, and widespread.

The general pattern of minelaying in Italy has fairly well paralleled that encountered in Sicily. The nature of the terrain has generally prevented the use of extensive minefields, such as those encountered in southern Tunisia. As in Sicily, the most heavily mined areas have been roads, valleys, natural approaches to objectives, trails, suitable bivouac areas, and demolitions. Abandoned towns and villages have been thickly mined

and booby-trapped. In his withdrawal, the enemy has had the advantage of knowing the most likely sites for artillery positions, and these have nearly always been thickly strewn with mines and booby traps. There have been no mined dry river and stream beds to cross, as was the case in Sicily. On the other hand, mined river banks have had to be negotiated in the several river crossing operations during the campaign.

2. TYPES OF MINES ENCOUNTERED

A number of different types of mines have been encountered in Italy, and some of these have been new. The different models of the Tellermine have been freely used by the enemy, and there has been an increased use of wooden mines, of both German and Italian design. In recent phases of the campaign, the wooden-type mines have largely exceeded the number of standard metal Tellermines used. A high-ranking U. S. Engineer officer has made the following comments on the mines encountered:

. . . The Germans are now using mainly wooden box and S-mines. S-mines have been encountered lately in quantities never seen before. We are now running into increasing numbers of Italian wooden box mines equipped with German bakelite igniters set for pressure, pull, and release. They are often in fields, but not necessarily scattered at random. For example, a whole olive grove will be mined and booby trapped with S-mines or wooden box mines, or both. Since the landing at Salerno, about 20 percent of all mines encountered have been of the wooden-box type.¹ The German wooden box type is

¹In late January it was reported that wooden mines represented about 40 percent of all mines cleared during that month.

about 12 inches square by 5 inches thick, and contains about 10 pounds of Triton or a similar explosive. The Italian ones are not quite so big.

In some areas newer types of improvised concrete antipersonnel mines have been discovered. One type is a spherical concrete case, 10 inches in diameter, enclosing standard German and Italian explosive charges equipped with standard types of igniters. Shrapnel has been used as aggregate in these concrete mines. Another type is a spherical concrete mine, 13 inches in diameter, cast in two halves, which are bolted together with steel rods. These have contained about 9 pounds of explosive, and have been equipped to receive detonating devices.

3. NOTES ON NEW ENEMY METHODS

a. Smoke-warning Booby Trap

The Germans are using a new type of booby trap, which consists of a German smoke canister, an incendiary detonator, a ZZ35 pull-igniter, and a trip wire.

The smoke canister is a cylinder, $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter and $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches high, which is painted green with two white bands around the outside. It is marked "Nb. K-S-39B." A threaded hole in the top will take a detonator and ordinary German booby-trap mechanisms. The detonators used are of a special incendiary type, and may be identified by a green band, $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch wide, around the closed end.

This booby trap has no morale or casualty effect.

However, if it is tripped during daylight hours, it will reveal the fact that movement is taking place. Presumably the German theory is that while the detonation of an S-mine or some other explosive charge may pass unnoticed by the defenders if considerable firing is in progress, the smoke from the booby trap will provide an unmistakable visual warning.

b. New Trip-wire Arrangement

Recently a new trip-wire system has been employed by the enemy. The trip wires are so arranged that German soldiers may trip over the wires without suffering casualties, whereas if advancing British or American soldiers trip over the wire, the detonation of the firing device may cause casualties to other men




Figure 21.—New German Trip-wire Arrangement.

advancing behind them. This new method of arranging trip wires is illustrated in figure 21.

c. Booby-trapping Telephone Wire

Recently a German patrol operating at night came across an artillery observation post telephone line, cut it, and booby-trapped the loose ends of the wire in the following manner. The enemy buried two S-mines about 10 yards apart, so that in each case about an inch of the detonator showed above the ground. Each of the loose ends of the telephone wire was attached to one of the S-mines with a 12-inch length of fine strong thread. It was the German intention that a linesman would carelessly pick up what he would assume to be merely a loose end of wire, and thus detonate an S-mine.

At the place where this booby-trapping was done, the telephone line ran quite close to an unimproved road. Four Tellermines were laid in the road, evidently for the purpose of destroying any maintenance truck which might be brought up. The Tellermines were not actually buried, but were covered with mud. The Germans probably realized that neither part of this ruse would offer much danger in daylight, but hoped that it would prove effective during the night if prompt maintenance of the line were attempted.

d. Laying Tellermines

As the enemy has been forced back in Italy, he has seized every possible opportunity to mine the most suitable artillery position areas in the terrain he has aban-

done. Numerous Tellermines, wooden box mines, anti-personnel mines, and various types of booby traps have been found in these positions. In one position no fewer than 32 Tellermines were removed from the ground on which a single gun was subsequently emplaced. The commander of a howitzer group recently reported, "In one battery position, a Tellermine was located by a detector. When the usual precautions were taken to disarm and remove the mine, a wire was found which led to 18 cases of dynamite buried in the position area. Each case contained 25 kilograms of explosive."


In many instances the terrain has definitely canalized tank movement, and has enabled the Germans to mine specific routes with every expectation that these would be traversed by tanks and other vehicles.

In one area the Germans had prepared a field of about 200 Tellermines, laying them in a variety of ways. There were no booby traps in this field, but 90 percent of the mines were double Tellermines (one mine laid on top of another), 4 percent were triple, and the remainder single. In all instances of double and triple laying, the mines were placed in close contact with each other, and only the top mine was primed. The purpose of this laying apparently was to increase the size and effect of the charge, which the Germans hoped would destroy entire tanks instead of tracks and bogie wheels alone.


In the case of another field of Tellermines, the Germans went in for triple laying, burying the mines at depths of 6 inches, 2 feet, and 4 feet, respectively. This

method evidently was adopted with the expectation that, after the top mine had been located and removed, the others would not be detected.

The Germans have also laid double Tellermines in dirt roads and trails, working from the outside edge of a bank, as illustrated in figure 22a. The enemy intention is that, after a number of tanks have used the road, the slope of the bank will be squeezed over and a rut



a



b

Figure 22.—German Method of Laying Tellermines in Dirt Roads and Trails.

eventually be worn down to the level of the top mine (see figure 22b).

e. Laying S-Mines

S-mines have been found in all kinds of locations, and in quantities varying from a few scattered mines to extensive fields containing as many as 300 mines. One of the many German practices in this respect is the laying of long, narrow antipersonnel mine belts in front of defensive positions. Although mine belts vary greatly in pattern, the following example is a good specimen of enemy procedure. The belt in question consisted of 50 push-igniter "S" mines and 50 pull-igniter "S" mines. The mines were laid in four rows, with the rows $5\frac{1}{2}$ yards apart and with the mines in each row 22 yards apart. The whole belt was bordered on each side by a fence consisting of a single strand supported by pickets 18 inches high.

Figure 23 illustrates the layout of the belt.

The stakes for pull-igniters were very noticeable, as were the trip wires. It is interesting to note that the "S" mines set with push-igniters were in outer rows, and "covered" the trip-wire stakes. Many of the push-igniter mines were completely buried.

Recently a detachment of Engineers lifted many S-mines which had been placed in tracks left in the earth by automobile tires. Apparently a vehicle had been driven over the place chosen for the S-mines, and, once the mines had been laid, they were camouflaged by




Figure 23.—A German Antipersonnel Mine Belt.

means of a carefully simulated tire impression which restored the pattern of the original track. The important point to note about this German ruse is that it should dispel any erroneous idea that a vehicle track is sure to be safe. The enemy technique discussed at the end of subparagraph d above gives further evidence that the mere presence of existing tracks is far from being a guarantee of safety.

In Sicily U. S. soldiers encountered large quantities of S-mines, often very cleverly hidden. A U. S. infantry officer, discussing this subject, said, "The Germans would cover the three prongs of the detonators with loose twigs and grass, so that you couldn't see them at all. At times they laid S-mines by the hundreds in dry stream beds, and covered the prongs with small pebbles, so that it was impossible for us to know they were there, inasmuch as the whole area was a mass of pebbles. The Germans also prepared booby traps by interlacing the trip wires in the branches and suckers of blackberry bushes. The average soldier would not have suspected the presence of wires at all."

Section IV. GERMAN SOLDIER TELLS OF THE BATTLE FOR AGIRA

1. INTRODUCTION

On 27 July 1943, after overcoming strong German resistance, British and American troops reached positions overlooking the town of Agira in Sicily. The following day the United Nations forces continued to bring pressure to bear from the northeast and northwest. In the evening of 28 July, Agira was captured. A substantial number of prisoners was taken, and many German dead were found.

On the 29th a private first class of a Panzer Grenadier unit, which had retreated from Agira to a new position several kilometers away, wrote a brief summary of the action at Agira. U. S. junior officers and enlisted men should find this narrative informative and useful, since it discusses the engagement from the point of view of an enemy infantryman.

2. ACTION AT AGIRA, AS A GERMAN SAW IT

For the past two weeks we have been fighting on Sicilian soil. The battle we fight here against British and American troops is tough. Since the fighting is taking place in mountainous, semi-tropical country, we are experiencing special conditions of terrain and climate to which we are not accustomed.

A few days ago, we were still in position on a tactically important height in front of the town of Agira. From this height the road to Agira could be controlled. The town itself had not yet been subjected to fire. However, the British and Americans realized the importance of this town, and made every effort to defeat us in order to occupy it.

Although we were able to hold our position for several days, we were not strong enough to resist indefinitely. Also, the hostile forces had at their disposal an unexpectedly large number of heavy weapons, which assaulted us day and night. With this support, the enemy succeeded in penetrating our positions at certain points during the night and crushing the front line. We then withdrew to the town of Agira, in order to preserve our strength and avoid unnecessary casualties.

There we were able to reorganize and make ready for further defense. Positions were prepared, manned, and improved. We of course expected a new attack by the hostile forces; however, for the time being, the enemy sent out only small forces for reconnaissance. He was being rather careful, and perhaps did not want to sacrifice troops unnecessarily. During this period each side tried to find out as much as possible about the other's positions and strength. Every so often, heavy weapons participated.

Only after some time did our patrols discover that the British and Americans, exploiting favorable approach possibilities under cover of darkness, had occupied several hills close to the town. Our forces staged counterattacks . . . but not until it was too late did we discover that it was the opposition's intention to bypass the town and block the routes of approach. Here and there, hostile tanks suddenly appeared, light personnel carriers came forward, and hostile artillery placed its "magic fire" [*Feuerzauber*] closer and closer to our positions. Our casualties and weapon losses increased, and our situation became more and more critical. Since our supply routes were under the steady fire of heavy artillery, we were able to bring

up rations and ammunition only in greatly reduced quantities and under cover of darkness.

The situation grew still worse when the hostile forces attacked the battalion echeloned on our right, and forced it back close to the town. The most severe fighting therefore took place near the western entrance to the town, where the attacking forces were strongest. The opposition was able to gain successes at certain points, although suffering losses.

Our defensive line was still intact. We had hoped that we might be able to break contact with the hostile forces after delaying them by house-to-house fighting. Unfortunately, we were prevented from using these tactics, inasmuch as we received an order to the effect that the town must be held for another 24 hours. Now the word was "Hold at any cost." We realized that the coming night would bring the crisis, upon which everything would depend. It came and passed—more quietly and better than any of us had expected. The British and Americans had penetrated only into the western part of the town, evidently moving with caution, and had established themselves there. We moved around the town, and occupied the northern entrance at dawn. The enemy tried to interfere with this tactical undertaking, but we placed sufficient fire on the attackers to force a withdrawal. We anxiously waited for night to fall. It was our intention to lose contact with the opposition after dark, since our delaying mission had been completed. All day long, every one of us wondered whether the opposition would remain inactive until nightfall and how everything would develop.

At dusk we made our preparations. Evacuating Agira as silently as possible, we made a night march of several kilometers, under very uncomfortable conditions, and took up a new position, where we are at present. It is on a steep hill, and is roughly opposite the same town for which we were fighting so bitterly only yesterday. Looking at it, we have only one thought and hope: to halt, weaken, and defeat the advancing enemy.

Section V. ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN TANK-HUNTING DETACHMENTS

The weapons and tactics of German tank hunters, who attempt to blind, halt, and destroy tanks and other armored vehicles in close-range combat, were discussed in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 12, pages 19-32. At that time it was stated that details of four or more specially trained tank hunters undertake such missions, but that a number of such details may be combined when a need arises. Recent information reveals that the Germans have been organizing and equipping tank-hunting detachments in a somewhat different manner.

1. DETACHMENTS OF 10 MEN

Tank-hunting detachments of 10 soldiers (a leader, who is usually a non-com, and nine men) have been organized and equipped as follows:

- a. Leader (equipped with a machine pistol, a signal pistol, and two hand grenades).
- b. Covering detail of two men (equipped with a machine gun and a rifle, blue or violet signal ammunition, and a blinker signalling apparatus; also five hand grenades and two smoke grenades for each man).
- c. Smoke detail of two men (each equipped with a

rifle, two smoke candles, three smoke grenades, a glass smoke grenade, and two hand grenades).

d. Demolition detail of five men (each equipped with a pistol or rifle, a smoke candle, a pole charge, a magnetic hollow charge, and a sliding mine [*Gleitmine*]).¹




Figure 24.—Typical German Disposition of a 10-man Tank-hunting Detachment in Foxholes.

Figure 24 illustrates a typical German disposition of a 10-man tank-hunting detachment in foxholes. The

¹ See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 12, p. 28 for an illustrated discussion of sliding mines and their tactical use. A typical sliding mine is shown on the next page.

foxholes are likely to be 4 feet long, 1½ feet wide, and chest-deep.

2. DETACHMENTS OF 13 MEN

Tank-hunting detachments of 13 soldiers (a leader who is usually a non-com, and 12 men) have been organized and equipped in the following manner:

a. Forward obstacle detail of two men (equipped with three or four pressure bars² or sliding mines; a rifle, three hand grenades, and a pole charge for each man).

b. Smoke detail of one man (equipped with a rifle, three smoke candles, four smoke grenades, and two hand grenades).

c. Covering detail, consisting of the leader and two men (the leader equipped with a machine pistol, and each of the two men equipped with a rifle and three hand grenades).




Figure 25.—German Sliding Mine.

² To make certain that the wheels of United Nations vehicles will not pass between Tellermines, the Germans often connect the mines by means of boards or bars laid over the firing devices of the mines. For this purpose the enemy has developed a standard metal pressure bar (see fig. 26).




Figure 26.—German Pressure Bar.

d. Demolition detail of two men (equipped with a pistol, a magnetic hollow charge, two pole charges, two




Figure 27.—Typical German Disposition of a 13-man Tank-hunting Detachment along a Road.

Molotov cocktails, two flares, and three or four hand grenades for each man).

e. Rear obstacle detail of one man (equipped with a rifle, two hand grenades, and a pressure bar).

f. Antitank rifle detail of two men (equipped with an antitank rifle, a rifle, and a pole charge).

g. Machine-gun detail of two men (equipped with a machine gun and hand grenades).

Figure 27 illustrates a typical German disposition of a 13-man tank-hunting detachment along a road.

Section VI. GERMAN EFFORTS TO BREAK UNITED NATIONS SECURITY

1. INTRODUCTION

When the Germans capture a hostile soldier, their primary interest is in documents or personal papers that he may be carrying. Experience has taught the Germans that United Nations prisoners are security-conscious, and that interrogators approaching them to gain information must implement the questioning with as much background knowledge as possible about the prisoner and his previous activities. In this connection the value, to the German interrogator, of all documents and personal papers—even those which are seemingly trivial and of no military importance—must not be underestimated. Although the intelligent soldier avoids carrying into battle areas any document which, to however slight a degree, might help an enemy interrogator in his job, German staff officers wait hopefully for the capture of that soldier who will prove an exception. Even then, the German enlisted man's fondness for acquiring souvenirs may upset the established procedure of German intelligence officers.

2. ENEMY USE OF CAPTURED PAPERS

It is important to remember that not even the small-

est scrap of information—whether written or oral—should be allowed to reach the enemy. A special order issued in November 1943 by the operations officer of a Panzer Grenadier division illustrates the enemy's recognition of the possible importance of every source of information, however slight:

In the past few days there have been numerous instances of forward troops delivering United Nations prisoners to the POW collecting point minus all documents and personal belongings. According to the statements of the prisoners, the forward troops took all these things from them immediately after their capture.

Apart from the fact that plundering of prisoners is unworthy of a German soldier, such conduct greatly increases the difficulties of interrogation and, with it, the procuring of important data for our own command and troops.

Because of the extreme stubbornness of British and American soldiers in divulging information, the papers and other articles that a prisoner carries on his person often provides the only background for an interrogator to open up a conversation with the prisoner. Moreover, almost all letters and papers can provide information which, when pieced together, will furnish details about a prisoner's unit. They also constitute an effective means, during interrogation, of verifying a prisoner's statements and sometimes of surprising him by catching him in a lie.

Troops are therefore definitely instructed that under no circumstances are any articles or papers to be removed from prisoners.

Strict surveillance is maintained, however, as a precaution against any attempt by prisoners to destroy items in their possession.

3. PROBLEM OF GERMAN INTERROGATION

In a special order, Major General von Ziehlberg, formerly commanding the German 65th Infantry Division, commented on some of the difficulties experienced by German interrogators. He said in part:

I myself have witnessed the interrogation of British soldiers who have received excellent training in security. Although threatened with the death penalty, they gave nothing away under interrogation. To all questions they replied simply, "My orders are to give only my name, rank, and number," and often added, "A German soldier in my position would not answer these questions either."

Thorough training must be given to our own soldiers to insure the same attitude on their part.

Section VII. GERMAN VIEWS ON USE OF THE MG 42

1. INTRODUCTION

The cyclic rate of fire of the German MG 42 is 25 rounds per second. Most of the disadvantages, as well as the advantages, of the gun can be attributed to this single characteristic. As a result of the high rate of fire, the gun has a marked tendency to "throw off," so that its fire stays on the target for a much briefer time than does that of the MG 34, which can fire only 15 rounds per second.

This section summarizes the German Army views as to the length of bursts to be used against hostile forces when the MG 42 is employed as a light machine gun or as a heavy machine gun.

2. AS A LIGHT MACHINE GUN

The Germans are instructed to fire bursts of from 5 to 7 rounds when they employ the MG 42 as a light machine gun, since an operator cannot hold his gun on the target for a longer period. The gun must be re-aimed after each burst. To enable the bursts to fall in as rapid a succession as possible, the Germans try to cut the aiming time to a minimum.

Under battle conditions the MG 42 can fire about 22

bursts per minute—that is, about 154 rounds. Under the same conditions, the MG 34 is capable only of about 15 bursts per minute, at a rate of 7 to 10 rounds per burst, totalling about 150 rounds. Thus the MG 42, used as a light machine gun, requires a slightly higher ammunition expenditure. Although the Germans believe that when the weapon is properly employed, the compactness and density of its fire pattern justify the higher expenditure, recent German Army orders have increasingly stressed the need of withholding machine-gun fire until the best possible effect is assured. Although the German defensive trick of “lying in wait” has been adopted partly to gain the tactical advantage of surprise, it also fits in with recent German efforts to conserve, not only ammunition, but all other matériel manufactured by the hard-pressed industries of the Reich and the occupied countries.

3. AS A HEAVY MACHINE GUN

German soldiers are instructed that when the MG 42 is employed as a heavy machine gun, sustained fire must be avoided at all costs. The German Army has ruled that the results of sustained fire are disappointing and that the expenditure of ammunition involved is “intolerable.”

This, and the following German observations, do not apply, however, to fire placed on large targets at short range.

The Germans believe that if the compact beaten zone of the MG 42 is on the target, a burst of 50 rounds

should be effective. If the burst is not on the target, the Germans are instructed to re-aim the gun and, if necessary, to adjust the sights.

The enemy considers it wrong to fire long bursts before fire for adjustment has been undertaken and observed. At a range of 2,000 yards, for example, the time of flight is 4.7 seconds. This means that the point of impact cannot satisfactorily be observed under 6 seconds. Six seconds of sustained fire results in an expenditure of 150 rounds. The German Army tells its soldiers that if they will wait to observe the point of impact in firing for adjustment, a burst of 50 rounds should then prove adequate.

While U. S. soldiers have expressed a healthy respect for the MG 42's high rate of fire, they agree that the gun's dispersion is very small—so small in fact, that they have frequently been able to make successful dashes out of the field of fire.

Section VIII. GERMAN TRIP-WIRE ALARM

The Germans have a trip-wire alarm device (*Alarm-schussgerät*) which gives warning of movement by patrols or individuals in areas where the Germans have erected wire defenses. This device (see fig. 28) consists of a box (1) into which an alarm cartridge (2) fits. Through the bottom passes a striker with a T-shaped head (3). By means of this head, the striker may be pulled down against a spring, for cocking.

A spring-equipped, right-angle lever (4), pivoted at the top (5), is forked on the horizontal part which passes beneath the box and holds the striker pin in the cocked position. A clamp (6) is fastened to the center of this lever; the jaws of this clamp grip the wire that is to serve as a trip wire. This may be a strand of an existing wire obstacle, a single wire erected for this particular purpose, or one of the wires used in binding together such obstacles as road blocks.¹

The alarm cartridge (2) is of the signal-cartridge type, 83-mm ($3\frac{1}{4}$ inches) long and 27-mm ($1\frac{1}{16}$ inches) in diameter. It weighs $2\frac{1}{2}$ ounces. The body is painted black. At night it is easy to identify the cartridge by touch, since its sealing disk (7) extends

¹ See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 40-46, for a discussion of German barbed-wire obstacles.

over the edge, and since the rim (8) of the base is half smooth and half grooved.

This alarm device is not difficult to set up. A picket (9) is driven into the ground near the wire. The device is well lubricated, and then is slipped over the picket, to which it is fastened by clamps (10). By adjusting the position of the retaining ring (11), it is possible to keep the device in place at a proper height for the jaws of the clamp (6) to grip the trip wire easily. The wire must be locked in such a position that it is not under any tension and therefore does not tend to move the lever. Slight pulling or pushing of the wire, however, should be enough to operate the device.

The alarm is tested by cocking. To do this, pull down the T-shaped head (3) until the cocking stop engages the fork of the lever (4). Then, if the wire is moved slightly, the striker pin should rise.

To load, pull down the retaining spring and side wall (12), and slide the alarm cartridge in from the front, over the striker pin. The device is then cocked as before. Now, however, the trip wire should not be touched.

When the alarm cartridge is fired, a flame about 6 feet high is produced. This flame will last for about 10 seconds, and will illuminate the surroundings within a radius of about 50 feet.

[Safety Note: The alarm cartridge, although closely resembling the signal cartridge fired from the standard German signal pistol, must on no account be used with that weapon.]




Figure 28.—German Trip-wire Alarm.

Section IX. STICK GRENADE, MODEL 24, AS A DEFENSIVE WEAPON

In Italy the German Army has been issuing the stick hand grenade, model 24, with a removable "shrapnel ring" fitted over the thin iron or steel casing, or head, of the grenade. This addition permits the German soldier to employ the grenade as a defensive weapon. The stick hand grenade with a shrapnel ring (labeled *Stielhandgranate 24 mit Splitterring*) is illustrated in figure 29.¹

It should be remembered that all the hand grenades used by the German Army are normally of the "offensive" type; that is, they have a thin metal casing with a high proportion of explosive filler. Since they are of this type, they depend on blast effect, instead of on fragmentation of the casing, as in the U. S. "defensive-type" Mills grenade. The normal German hand grenades can be used safely by men advancing erect in the open, because they can be thrown a distance greater than their effective bursting radius.

On the other hand, the German stick hand grenade with a shrapnel ring is intended solely for use as a

¹ There continues to be an urgent need for all military personnel to turn over captured material and documents to the proper authorities. In the case of the *Stielhandgranate mit Splitterring*, for example, prompt action taken by Pvt. Jerry S. Hardy, A.S.N. 19002098, was of great value to intelligence officers.




Figure 29.—German Stick Hand Grenade with Shrapnel Ring Added.

defensive weapon. Enemy instructions state that soldiers are to use it only when they are protected by good cover, since the shrapnel is effective up to a radius of 30 meters (about 32½ yards). Without the ring, the grenade may be used in the usual manner.

These grenades are packed in boxes of five.

DISTRIBUTION: C and H (2).

(For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6.)



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JUNE 1944

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

War Department

Washington 25, D. C.
June 1944

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★

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★

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PART ONE: GERMANY

Section I. U. S. SOLDIERS DESCRIBE ENEMY METHODS IN ITALY

In a series of informal discussions, a number of U. S. junior officers and enlisted men who have been fighting the Germans at Cassino and the Anzio beachhead have made the following useful comments on enemy combat methods. This section should be regarded as supplementary to *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 9, pages 61-65, in which some recent German tactics were discussed by U. S. Army unit commanders and observers.

On the Anzio beachhead the enemy is making considerable use of his light machine gun and machine pistol. The latter is not too accurate, but has a very high rate of fire. The artillery that the enemy is employing is mostly 105-mm, 88-mm, and long-range 170-mm. The light and medium artillery consists chiefly of self-propelled guns, which are moved frequently to create an impression that the Germans are using more guns than is actually the case. A self-propelled gun will sometimes have as many as five or six firing positions. The enemy has also been using the six-barreled rocket projector.¹

Many offensive moves have been made by patrols varying in size from five to two hundred men. The objectives have been

¹ This is the *Nebelwerfer 41*, which was described in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 9-15.

limited—usually a commanding hill. The Germans often made only a single thrust—retiring if this was unsuccessful.

Once the Germans have established a defensive line, they usually hold it lightly with automatic weapons. The enemy maintains a strong mobile reserve capable of counterattacking at any point which is pierced or threatened. In other words, the Germans try to catch the attacker in a disorganized state and throw him off balance. The enemy is likely to counter-attack a position he has just lost, even if he employs only a squad or a handful of men for the job. This has been done on numerous occasions, particularly in the Venafro area. However, counterattacks are usually made in greater strength.

Although the Germans often lay down heavy artillery and mortar fire before an attack, they sometimes make lavish use of such fire without following it with an attack. In one sector the Germans laid down a concentration of ten rounds per minute for 60 minutes, and even then no attack followed.

The Germans have used motorcycles at night to drown out the sounds of moving tanks and other vehicles.

The fighting I was engaged in took place in mountains and hills. It was possible for the enemy to use a minimum of men to defend a maximum of ground. Usually, German organization of the ground was excellent. Commanding terrain features were given the utmost attention. Gun positions were well built and had good fields of fire. As a rule, when a key position was overrun and taken, the Germans evacuated the supporting positions and retired to prepared positions in the rear.

German mortar fire usually followed a specific procedure: the enemy would try to pin us down with small-arms and machine-gun fire and then deluge us with mortar fire.

Enemy soldiers who were left in positions to provide covering fire generally fought until their ammunition was exhausted. Then they surrendered.

The machine pistol was used constantly as a harassing weapon.

On the Cassino front, the Germans used dugouts made of reinforced concrete and steel. The walls were about 5 feet thick. One of these dugouts withstood direct 75-mm fire at 10 yards. In general, they had excellent fields of fire, with trees and other obstacles cleared in front of firing slits.

German deployment in the attack often is poor.

In the defense the enemy uses very good judgment in selecting his fields of fire. At night he will fire at sound. The mortar and the M.G. 42 are his main weapons; he uses the machine pistol for sniping and in protecting the M.G. 42. He stays well concealed, and is very hard to move when he has the advantage of high ground.

If you drive him from his guns during a barrage and get into his positions, he will come back with his hands up until he reaches his guns. He will then drop down and open fire, also making use of hand grenades.

Enemy firing positions are mutually supporting. The trenches are usually well dug-in and are about 4 feet deep. The dirt is sometimes scattered, but I've noticed that the dirt is generally used to form an embankment beside the trench. When time permits, the pits for two or more men are usually covered with heavy logs for protection. The logs are then covered with some dirt, and are camouflaged with brush or hay to blend with the countryside.

Jerry makes good use of his mobile artillery. In the evening Jerry would bring in his guns and fire on some previously observed or reconnoitered hill where our troops were. Then, before daylight, he would pull out.

At night, time fire from German artillery was directed on

our installations by flares dropped from planes. By a similar method, areas have been illuminated for observation.

One batch of prisoners that we captured was armed with machine pistols, which had been used extensively to make a small patrol sound like a company.

The Germans often construct reinforced concrete pillboxes inside houses. This method gives the enemy first-rate camouflage.

German artillery adjustments sometimes were made with one piece (not always, of course) and, when the adjustments were completed, a high burst or a smoke round was fired to bring the impacts on the target. When our artillery was firing close-in support on enemy front-line installations, the Germans often fired immediately after we did, to make it appear that we were firing short and on our own troops.

Many of the enemy's installations are prepared beforehand with heavy engineer equipment, particularly in rocky positions. His weapons often are in shallow emplacements, with deep, well-covered personnel dugouts nearby. These dugouts are often reinforced with steel plating, concrete, timbers, railroad ties, and several feet of dirt.

The enemy's weapon training has obviously been thorough. His M.G. 42 is a very rapid-firing gun, but it is likely to be laid on a final protective line and fired only on that. It is seldom fired in well-placed or aimed bursts.

The enemy makes extensive use of his mortars. As long as he has observation, and is not actually getting fire on his gun position, he will fire on any likely target.

At first, the enemy's defense may seem to be very loose and poorly organized, but, as it develops, it usually turns out to be exactly the opposite. He has had every opportunity to prepare his positions beforehand, and they are very well built and concealed. Often the places that don't appear to be under

fire are thickly laid minefields, which are not fired on until we have nearly cleared or crossed them. They are then subjected to concentrated mortar fire.

The enemy uses all kinds of ruses. He will often fire continually in one sector, to draw attention from a nearby sector which he wishes to reinforce or evacuate.

Section II. GROUND TACTICS OF GERMAN PARATROOPS

The commander of a German parachute demonstration battalion recently issued to his companies a directive which affords useful insight into some of the ground tactics that enemy paratroopers may be expected to employ. The following extracts from the battalion commander's order are considered especially significant:

1. For parachute and air-landing operations, I have given orders for section leaders and their seconds-in-command to carry rifles, and for the No. 3 men on the light machine guns to carry machine carbines. There are tactical reasons for this decision. The section commander must be able to point out targets to his section by means of single tracer rounds. The No. 3 man on the light machine gun must be able to give this gun covering fire from his machine carbine in the event that close combat takes place immediately after landing. This last should be regarded as a distinct possibility. He must provide this covering fire until the light machine gun is in position and ready to fire. Before the assault, the No. 3 man on the light machine gun must also be able to beat off local counterattacks with his machine carbine until the machine gun is ready to go into action.

2. Since so many targets are likely to be seen only for a fleeting moment, and since the rifleman himself must disappear from hostile observation as soon as he has revealed his position by firing, the German paratrooper must be extremely

skillful at "snap shooting" (rapid aiming and firing). The following three points are to be noted and put into practice:

a. Snap shooting is most useful at short ranges. It will not be employed at ranges of more than 330 yards, except in close combat and defense, when it will generally be employed at ranges under 1,100 yards.

b. Even more important than rapid aiming and firing is rapid disappearance after firing, no matter what the range may be.

c. Movement is revealing, also. Men must move as little as possible and must quickly find cover from fire at each bound.

3. I leave to company commanders the distribution of automatic and sniper rifles within companies. I wish only to stress the following principles:

a. Wherever possible, sniper and automatic rifles will be given to those paratroopers who can use them most effectively. In general practice, this rules out commanders and headquarters personnel (who have duties other than firing).

b. There seems to be a general but incorrect impression that our sniper rifles improve the marksmanship of men who are only moderately good shots. These rifles are provided with telescopes only to make more distinct those targets which are not clearly visible to the naked eye. This means that an advantage accrues solely to very good marksmen firing at medium ranges—and, what is more, only where impact can be observed and the necessary adjustments made. Since the sniper is seldom in a position where he can observe for himself, a second man, with binoculars, generally will be detailed to work with the sniper.

4. I wish company commanders to make the report on the Battle of Crete the subject of continual reference in their own lectures, and in the lectures of platoon commanders who are training noncoms. I particularly desire that those passages in the report which deal with the importance of the undertaking

as a whole be drilled into every man. The last three exercises I have attended have shown me that this principle is by no means evident to all platoon commanders. Platoon commanders in this battalion are still too much inclined to fight their own private brands of war instead of paying attention to the larger picture.

5. It is extremely likely that, during a parachute or air-landing operation, this battalion will land in hostile positions not previously reconnoitered, and will have to fight for the landing area. Such fighting will be carried out according to the same regulations which would obtain if we had fought our way into the heart of a hostile position.

6. Inasmuch as we shall soon be receiving our new machine guns,¹ training with those new machine guns we already have must be pushed forward in our light companies—at least to the extent of giving the No. 1 men about 1½ hours a day on it. The most important point to be driven home is that this weapon is to be fired in very short bursts to avoid waste of ammunition.²

7. During the exercises and field firing demonstrations I have witnessed—I admit they have been few—I did not once see yellow identification panels used to mark our forward line, nor did I see the swastika flags used to identify our own troops to friendly aircraft. Henceforth, these panels and flags will be carried on all occasions and will be spread out at the proper times.

8. I wish platoon exercises to include more emphasis on the attacks on well prepared defensive positions. This will include cooperation between two assault detachments and a reserve assault (“mopping-up”) detachment.

Each German paratroop company commander, it is

¹ Here the German battalion commander is probably referring to a consignment of regular or modified M.G. 42's.

² No doubt the enemy also hopes that this precaution will help to keep the fire on the target.

reported, must designate five to seven of his best men as a tank-hunting detachment. These men perform their regular duties, but are prepared to act as a team in their tank-hunting capacity whenever they may be called upon. The infantry training of German paratroopers is usually very thorough, covering all normal training and, in some instances, use of the light machine gun, heavy machine gun, mortar, and antitank rifle, as well. Cunning and initiative are stressed. Many men are taught to drive tanks and other vehicles. Use of simple demolitions and the handling of antitank and antipersonnel mines are often included in the training.

Section III. HOW PARATROOPS CLEAR FIELDS FOR GLIDERS

1. INTRODUCTION

The Germans are well aware that troops dropped by parachute must be supplied rapidly with sufficient reinforcements, equipment, ammunition, and rations if the average paratroop operation is to have a fighting chance of success. To achieve this, the Germans stipulate that the first mission of certain designated paratroopers, on landing in the jump area, is to improvise a landing field for gliders. Reinforcement by air-landing troops is the first use to which an improvised field is put. Supplies which cannot be dropped are landed next. After this, the Germans try to establish an organized supply system, which will include full protection of the supplies arriving and an orderly distribution to the troops.

2. RECONNAISSANCE FOR SUITABLE FIELDS

If German paratroops are forced to engage in combat immediately upon hitting the ground or shortly afterward, the designated soldiers attempt to reconnoiter for suitable landing fields not too far from the area in which fighting is in progress, and yet, wherever possible, out of range of hostile fire. The German

preference is for a field near a road or path leading to the fighting troops. It is regarded as essential that the surrounding obstacles permit a glide of at least "1 in 15."¹ An effort is made to provide each regiment with one glider landing field having at least two landing strips. The object is to allow a number of gliders to land simultaneously. An ideal field, the Germans specify, is one which permits gliders to land regardless of the direction in which the wind is blowing.

The Germans regard the following as unfavorable features: very rocky, uneven ground; stony ground where the stones go deeper than 2 feet and consequently are hard to remove; swampy or wooded ground; ground with thick vegetation, ditches, stone walls, hedges, wire fences, and so on.

The following, on the other hand, are described as favorable features: moderately soft ground with grass; ground with tall grass and even a little vegetation; farm land, even if furrowed; corn fields (which are fairly easy to clear); and sandy ground, even if it is somewhat pebbly.

¹ This means that the length of the landing field must be at least 15 times the height of the trees or other obstacles which fringe the field. See figure 1.




Figure 1.—German Improved Landing Field for Gliders.

Besides the above, the prevailing wind direction also influences the German choice of a field.

3. CONSTRUCTION OF LANDING FIELDS

All obstacles are removed, not only from the landing strip, but from a zone 65 feet wide on each side of the strip. Uneven ground is leveled. Although normally every precaution is taken to lessen the danger of crash landings, the Germans follow an interesting procedure if time is very short or if the terrain presents great difficulties. Under these circumstances, the Germans clear at least one-third of the landing strip, on the principle that this much of a strip will at least decrease the speed of a glider somewhat after it touches the ground, and that crash landings will consequently be eased to some extent.

Just off the landing strips, parking areas are prepared for the gliders already landed. These parking areas are so arranged as not to hinder further development of the landing strip, in case this is ordered later. Vegetation stripped from the landing field is saved, and is used in camouflaging the parked gliders.

The center of the landing strip is marked with identification panels for air recognition, and the wind direction is shown by a large T made with panels and, indicated when necessary, by smoke as well.

Section IV. NEW GERMAN RIFLE FOR PARATROOPERS

The Germans have a new 7.92-mm automatic rifle, the F.G. 42 (*Fallschirmjäger Gewehr 42*), which is a light and versatile weapon, especially suitable for use by German airborne personnel. It should be remembered that the 9-mm machine carbines (M.P. 38/40), which are now in general use, were originally introduced as parachutists' weapons; in like manner, the Germans may well put this new 7.92-mm rifle to more general use in the future.

The new rifle (see fig. 2), which represents a departure in small-arms design, is a close-combat weapon firing any 7.92-mm Mauser rifle ammunition, and combines a relatively light weight¹ with a reasonable degree of accuracy both in single-round and automatic fire. The Germans have struck a balance between the weight limitations of the machine carbine and the power and pressure requirements of the rifle or light machine gun.

The F.G. 42 is air-cooled and gas-operated. In spite of the extensive use of stamping, instead of intricate machine-tool work, and in spite of the fact that all com-

¹ The F.G. 42 weighs 10¾ pounds with the bayonet and with a filled 20-round magazine.



Figure 2.—New German Paratrooper's Rifle.

ponent weights have been reduced to a minimum, the new weapon is fairly sturdy.

It is provided with a light folding bipod and a spike bayonet which, when attached, increases the over-all length of the rifle from 3 feet 1 inch to 3 feet 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ inches. The feed is from a 20-round box magazine which fits into the left side of the gun. The magazine may be loaded separately or from standard 5-round Mauser clips from the right side of the gun.

The F.G. 42 may well be used as a "powerful" machine carbine, as a "short range" self-loading rifle, or as a light machine gun when mounted on the bipod.

Section V. RATIONS AS A FACTOR IN PARATROOP EFFICIENCY

It is popularly but wrongly supposed that German paratroopers are granted special ration privileges at all times. Membership in German parachute units (as in the case of U. S. Army parachute units) is on a voluntary basis, and in this connection the Germans put out a good deal of propaganda about special rations, to attract volunteers. The truth is that enemy paratroops receive special rations only just before actual parachute operations. When these soldiers are to go into combat as ordinary infantrymen, no additional rations are issued.

However, the specially planned rations that are given to German paratroopers prior to jumping (both in training and in combat) have a significance, the importance of which will not escape the intelligent U. S. fighting man. These rations include items which are not only attractive to the Germans, thereby building morale, but which will actually increase the physical stamina of the paratroop personnel. Incidentally, the special rations, creating a heartier appetite, lead to greater consumption of ordinary food; although the latter may be less attractive, they are energy-giving and naturally help to improve physical fitness.

White bread and dairy products, such as milk and fresh eggs, are considered real luxuries by the German soldiers; these items normally are not issued to troops of the other arms and services as part of the regular diet. On the day that a jump is to be made, German paratroopers are given the following, in addition to their normal ration:

- approx. .7 lb. white bread
- approx. .25 lb. crackers
- approx. .06 lb. butter
- approx. 1 pt. fresh milk
- 1 fresh egg

A ration of an entirely different kind is issued on days when long flights are to be made. The Germans have studied the nutritional benefits of specialized rations, and have concluded that on long flights regular rations sit too heavily on the stomach. The rations described below are issued only when two flights of two hours duration are to be made, or a single flight lasting four hours or more.

- approx. .16 lb. crystallized fruits
- approx. .25 lb. crackers
- approx. .06 lb. sugar
- approx. .04 lb. butter
- 1 bar of chocolate substitute

Analysis of this ration indicates that it contains an abundance of energy-giving foods which will sustain the individual without causing gastric discomfort.

The Germans have adopted an iron ration which is intended to last for a three-day period during operations. This emergency ration is similar to those developed by the United States and Great Britain. A ration of this bulk can easily be carried on the person, and provides the necessary "lift" for a man to carry out the most arduous tasks. It consists of:

- 2 cans of sausage
- 2 cans of cheese
- 1 bar of chocolate substitute
- 1 package of crackers
- 6 packages of chewing gum
- 1 package of lemonade powder
- 1 package of coffee mixed with sugar
- 1 tablet of solid fuel for heating

The iron rations are intended to make the German paratrooper self-sufficient for a limited period of time. Inclusion of the fuel tablet allows him to prepare a hot beverage, and yet maintain individual security precautions. This tablet burns for about 5 minutes, yielding a smokeless white flame 2 or 3 inches high.

Section VI. A GERMAN'S REACTION TO A BRITISH NIGHT ATTACK

After a recent action near Minturno, Italy, in which a British raiding party attacked a German antitank-gun pillbox, a German prisoner gave a detailed description of the attack, from an enemy point of view.

In the evening of 30 December, the prisoner arrived at the pillbox, which was situated at one end of a bridge across the Garigliano River. He was to serve as the new gun commander. The man already in command, who was to be relieved with his crew the following day, was to give him full instructions as to the mission, the targets, and so on. Thus there were two gun commanders in the pillbox at the same time, as well as three crew members. (The prisoner stated that a new gun commander had also been dispatched to a second antitank gun position, further south, to take over the following day.)

At about 2200, the British laid down an artillery barrage. The prisoner commented that although the concrete pillbox received several hits, which shook the occupants severely, it did not collapse. For this reason, he said, he felt comparatively safe; but he admitted that the barrage frayed his nerves badly. He said that he did not blame the German infantry in exposed posi-

tions along the west bank of the river for having withdrawn to the rear. However, he added, if these German troops had not withdrawn, it would have been impossible for the British to advance from that direction and, in a surprise move, arrive in his sector.

When the barrage lifted, intense firing was going on east of the river. From the noise and the length of combat, he deduced that the British forward platoon was fighting well.

At about 0400 his entire sector was illuminated by flares. In the bright light he could see some men running in and out of the ruins of a Roman amphitheater about 200 yards away. He was unable to tell whether they were friend or foe.

By this time the men in the pillbox had been joined by a corporal of engineers, who had fled from his post at the river, where he had been on ferrying duty with a small detachment.

During the entire night, frantic discussions went on in the pillbox as to what course of action should be taken; however, since everyone was both confused and frightened, the discussions resulted in nothing more than excited talking and gesturing.

From the entrance, the prisoner suddenly noticed a number of men—about 100, he estimated—rising from the grass to the south and advancing quickly toward the ruins of the amphitheater. This advance was conducted quite silently, compared to the sounds which came from the amphitheater a few minutes later. The

prisoner said that what happened next was like a fantastic play, with black figures moving in all directions under flares, with the sound of firing mingled with the music of bagpipes. The prisoner said that during lulls in the firing he could observe British troops moving along the main road—silently, because of their rubber soles. He observed that this was in marked contrast to the sound of German boots he had heard when, before the attack, German soldiers had been moving about in the vicinity of the amphitheater.

A number of British soldiers advanced toward the pillbox, and the occupants went into a huddle to try to figure out a means of escape. The prisoner unblocked one of the two apertures, but could barely push his head through. The old gun commander decided to open fire with a machine pistol. He loaded it, fired a magazine, and then shouted for more ammunition, not realizing that five magazines were lying close beside him. The prisoner mustered courage, and fired two rounds with his own machine pistol, only to find that the feeding had stopped, probably because of a broken magazine spring.

The advancing British fired a machine-gun burst into the pillbox, killing the old gun commander and one of the crew. Going to the antitank-gun aperture, the prisoner saw some British soldiers moving toward the shelter from the undefended side. The prisoner crouched by the aperture, which had been cleared in the hope that escape in that direction would be possible;

however, any such move now was out of the question. A British soldier approached, and fired his machine gun into the pillbox. In the dark he unwittingly rested his gun on the prisoner's thigh. The German, who was terrified, remained motionless.

By this time the men in the shelter were so confused that when a smoke hand grenade was hurled through an aperture, they quickly obeyed an order to surrender.

The Germans were led to the amphitheater and then to the river. They had to swim across the river—"a hazardous venture," the prisoner remarked, "because of whirlpools created by the debris of the demolished bridges."

By the time they had reached the other side of the river, German artillery had opened up. The prisoner noticed that during the German artillery fire, British soldiers always hit the ground, whereas the German prisoners remained standing. This prisoner implied that long experience on the receiving end of artillery fire had taught the Germans to judge direction of fire and impact.

"The sureness of the execution and the fact that picked men were employed for the task made the raid a success," the prisoner commented. He spoke with respect of the use of rubber soles, daggers, blackened faces, and so on, and of the fire power of the light automatic weapons. He said that he felt obliged to couple with these factors the inadequacy of the German defense of the sector. The positions were too far forward,

a central command was lacking, and no minefields had been prepared. Before the British attack, he said, he and the other men in the pillbox had discussed "the ridiculous defense layout."

The other prisoners corroborated this German's belief that the attack achieved absolute surprise in all parts of the sector.

Section VII. GERMAN TANK PLATOONS OPERATING AS POINTS

This section discusses the composition and employment of German tank platoons operating as points. Although the information in this account comes from an unofficial source, it is believed to be substantially correct.

1. COMPOSITION

The point platoon is generally made up of the platoon leader's tank and two sections of two tanks each. The platoon leader may place either the first or second section at the head of the point platoon, but he himself always stays between the two sections in order to observe his entire outfit. However, the composition of the point varies according to the situation.

The strength of the point platoon may be increased in mountainous terrain. During the German invasion of the Balkans, the point amounted to an extra-strong company and consisted of heavy tanks, assault weapons, tanks with the long 75-mm and 50-mm guns, an infantry platoon, and a detachment of engineers. A platoon of five Pz. Kw. 4's led the point. Behind them came a group of engineers, riding either on the last tanks in the point or on other tanks immediately fol-

lowing. After that came a platoon of self-propelled assault guns (four short-barreled 75-mm's), then the platoon of infantry riding in armored personnel carriers, and finally a platoon of five Pz. Kw. 3's. There were no motorcycle couriers.

At the historic Thermopylae Pass, in Greece, there were 22 tanks in the spearhead, but only three of these got through. A responsible German officer's comment on this was that it was worth losing the 19 tanks in order to achieve success with the three.

2. COMMUNICATION

a. Within the Point Platoon

In combat, communication within the German tank platoon operating as a point is done basically by radio. Up to that time, liaison is maintained by at least one or two motorcycle couriers attached to the platoon leader. As soon as contact with a hostile force is established, these couriers scatter to the sides and lie in ditches until the whole platoon has passed. They then go back to the company commander and report to him that contact has been made. After this, he carries on by radio.

b. Within the Armored Regiment

As has been stated, there are five tanks in each platoon—two in each section and one for the platoon leader. The platoon leader and each section leader has a two-way radio; the two remaining tanks have receiv-

ing sets only. Regimental commanders and all three battalion commanders have special radio cars, each equipped with 100-watt sets. If the battalions (or companies) attack together, they have radio communication with the regiment. When they attack separately, each uses, in addition to his two-way radio (*Funk Gerät 5*), four sets capable only of receiving (*Funk Gerät 2's*). Each of these receiving sets is used for communication with one of the four companies. Moreover, each company is on a different frequency. In turn, each company commander has a two-way set and two receiving sets, and can speak with the battalion commander.

Each battalion, too, is normally on a different frequency. The platoon is on the same frequency as its company commander. Each platoon leader has his second receiving set tuned to the frequency of his battalion commander, in case his company commander should become a casualty.

If the regiment attacks as a unit, the network remains unchanged. However, if the battalions act independently, the regimental commander has no communication with them except by messengers, usually motorcyclists.

Code is used only with the 100-watt sets, from battalion up to division. During the attack, communication is in the clear, even up to the regimental commander. When battalions attack separately, how-

ever, they use code in communicating with the regimental commander.

The division commander alone authorizes messages in the clear. If the battalion commander cannot reach his regimental commander by using the two-way *Funk Gerät* 5 (which has a range of 6 kilometers), he encodes his message and uses the 100-watt set.

3. ON THE MARCH

a. Combat Vehicles

It is a German principle that the distance between the rear of the point platoon and the company commander must not be so great that the latter cannot see the former. It can be, but seldom is, as much as 1 kilometer. The spacing depends entirely on the terrain. All movement is made by road until a hostile force is encountered. The tanks then scatter to the sides. Even when there is danger of air attack, the tanks remain on the road but keep well apart. In mountainous country, when heavy tanks are used in the point, the method of advancing on roads is altered. Two tanks advance together, one behind the other but on the opposite side of the road.

The sections are easily interchangeable; for example, should the first section be at the head of the platoon and then leave the road to overcome hostile resistance, the second section can move to the head, allowing the first section to fall in behind when the resistance has

been overcome. The Germans believe that it is of the utmost importance to keep the platoon moving forward.

b. Supply Column

During the campaign in Greece, all supply trucks were placed at the rear. In any other position they would have delayed the movement, because of the twisting mountainous roads. Any truck that was damaged was immediately shoved off the road to keep the column moving at all costs.

In more recent operations, when facing the possibility of a guerrilla attack from the front (rather than from the flank), the Germans have been known to sandwich elements of the supply column between tank platoons on the march. The important ration and fuel trucks have even traveled between tanks within a platoon. While this plan has not been followed by a point platoon, it has been employed by the platoons following immediately afterward in the line of march. The same plan has occasionally been used by German battalions on the march, but only when there has been a danger of attacks by guerrillas or when road conditions have been so bad that supply trucks have needed tanks close at hand at all times, for emergency towing.

Section VIII. NEW GERMAN EMPHASIS ON SALVAGING MATÉRIEL

While United Nations air forces bomb German factories, the ground forces of these nations are destroying vital enemy matériel in combat. The importance of these combined blows against Germany's war economy, as well as against her military machine, is tremendous. The average U. S. soldier may not realize that to deprive the German Army of matériel of any kind is a great help in speeding victory. German leaders, however, are well aware of the extent of these blows, and are making every effort to impress their troops with the increased necessity for recovering and salvaging matériel.

One of the best illustrations of the German matériel shortage as it affects the individual soldier in the field is this typical regimental order regarding the loss of weapons and other equipment:

Recent heavy fighting has caused substantial casualties in killed, wounded, and missing. This alone, however, is not sufficient explanation for the losses in matériel that we have suffered. I am well aware that many members of this regiment—officers included—do not sufficiently realize their responsibility for the recovery and salvage of weapons and equipment, or even parts thereof, which have been damaged in combat. Moreover, and as a consequence of such losses, the

problem of replacing matériel is growing more and more difficult. Indeed, in some cases the problem absolutely cannot be solved. This leads to a dangerous weakening of our combat efficiency.

The reputation of our regiment will suffer disastrously if such losses continue. I do not propose to let this happen. On the contrary, I am determined to employ the severest punishment to end unsoldierly carelessness, wherever it exists.

I am convinced that commanders of all grades, despite the heavy strain under which they labor, will fully understand and support me in my efforts. This particularly applies to battalion and company commanding officers. With the foregoing in mind, I give the following order:

Putting aside all personal considerations, and renouncing their well-deserved hours of rest, the battalion, company, platoon, and squad leaders will thoroughly investigate and explain all matériel losses suffered during the past month and, as of today, will report such losses after future engagements. The battalion and company commanders will personally certify by signature that these investigations are being conducted with the utmost thoroughness and that the troops have been instructed regarding the consequences the individual soldier will have to face if he cannot justify the loss of a weapon. It must be driven home to every soldier that he can avoid punishment by bringing back even some parts of the weapons and equipment entrusted to him. Furthermore, every soldier must be taught that even the smallest parts are valuable inasmuch as they can be used again in the manufacture of weapons.

I am fully aware of the additional paper work that these reports will involve. Their importance to the war effort, however, makes it necessary for me to call for them. On the other hand, if future losses in combat are avoided, the reports will not have to be made.

In order to investigate individual cases, use must also be made of those periods during which the unit is in reserve.

Within 48 hours after return to the rest area, units will file reports regarding losses of weapons and equipment. For every loss, one or more soldiers will be held responsible. These names will be listed in the report, as well as the action taken in each case. Units which have not suffered losses will file negative reports.

In addition to suffering losses of weapons and equipment in the course of military operations, the Germans continually lose matériel at the front through acts of sabotage. It will readily be seen that the aggregate loss, from all causes, constitutes an economic factor so great that whenever the U. S. soldier captures even a single piece of enemy equipment, or destroys it in action, he deals a much greater blow to the German war effort than he may realize at the time.

As to sabotage in the field, the following are characteristic of acts which recently have been committed against the flow of German motor traffic. This list, which comes from an authoritative source, demonstrates how elements friendly to the United Nations are helping the liberating armies to destroy the enemy's vital equipment and supplies.

a. Fences around ditches on roads have been damaged in such a manner that vehicles have been in danger of driving into the ditches at night.

b. Stone road blocks have been erected across roads after dark.

c. Gasoline tanks have been filled with water, and gasoline pipes have been smashed.

d. Hand grenades have been attached to parked motorcycles in such a manner that operation of the vehicles detonated the grenades.

e. Nails have been sprinkled on roads. (Recently, new nails have been removed from nearly all flat tires.)

Section IX. SOME NOTES ON GERMAN INTELLIGENCE METHODS

I. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS

It cannot be stressed too often that German efforts to extract information from prisoners are not limited to open-and-aboveboard questioning, but have been known to include trickery of every conceivable kind. U. S. soldiers must realize that when a prisoner has been asked a number of questions during an interview and has told his captors, "I can give only my name, rank, and serial number," German scheming to break his security has only just begun.

In Rome there was a combined Italian and German camp for prisoners of war. The Germans, thwarted by the high sense of security that their prisoners displayed, resorted to the following ruse. After a soldier's means of personal identification had been taken away from him, he would be given an artificial chance to escape. When he was recaptured, the authorities then would pretend that they did not know him, and that they were unable to identify him as a combatant. They would threaten to regard him as a spy and to execute him unless he would truthfully answer a questionnaire covering some very detailed military information. A prisoner who was treated in this manner, and who of

course refused to divulge any information, was put into solitary confinement for eight days and nights, with rations of rice, bread, and water. After this, he was again given the questionnaire, and was told that he would be freed if he would answer it. When he refused a second time, he was kept in confinement for a few more days, and then was returned to a regular prisoner-of-war camp.

In an attempt to obtain information from an RAF noncom, the Germans asked him whether he would like to be sent to a permanent camp where he had friends. A list of personnel was read to him, in an effort to get him to indicate those he knew. His squadron leader, who was still in England, was included in the list.

On the day that this same noncom was to leave the transit camp, he was told that an RAF squadron leader had requested, and had been granted permission to meet all RAF personnel in the camp. The noncom was taken to an office where he was greeted cheerfully by a man who wore a squadron leader's uniform and who spoke English without a foreign accent. This man asked him how he had been treated, and expressed the hope that he had divulged nothing. The bogus officer then produced a notebook in which he said, he was compiling records that some day would be useful to the British Air Ministry. He asked many questions about the sergeant's squadron. When the prisoner refused to answer, he was threatened with a postwar charge for disobeying a superior officer, and finally was dismissed with curses.

An escaped British flight sergeant has given an account of how he was placed in a cell with two men dressed as Royal Tank Regiment officers, who told him their unit and asked him to tell his. They then showed him various articles that they were planning to use in an attempt to escape, and tried to lure him into a discussion of the possibilities of escaping by air. When the sergeant was questioned about forward airfields, he stated that he knew nothing about them. By this time his suspicions had been aroused, inasmuch as they did not know what "Mk V" on his service watch stood for. An observer in this sergeant's plane had exactly the same sort of experience with other stool pigeons posing as British officers.

The Germans generally make a point of having stool pigeons pose as belonging to a branch of service other than that to which a prisoner belongs. Obviously, the purpose of this is to make it easier for a stool pigeon to hide his ignorance of the many small, everyday details that he otherwise would be expected to know.

2. SIGNAL SECURITY AND INTERCEPTION

A German prisoner, who served in the signal section of an armored division recently encountered in Italy, has described an intercept unit of from 10 to 15 sets which served with his division. Part of the unit was said to concentrate on locating and identifying all possible stations, down to company (and British squadron) level, while the other part listened to the nets thus

identified and selected those which afforded the best information. Identification was made by a careful analysis of the characteristics of each set and each operator.

The division's artillery regiment was said to have a special direction-finding component which apparently attempted to discover the area from which each projectile came. To do this, the Germans tried to intercept fire orders, locate the stations on the net concerned, and coordinate the results with reports of hostile shelling. This procedure was not especially successful.

The foregoing points very clearly to the fact that any carelessness with respect to communication security is extremely dangerous. The Germans are continuously hunting for random bits of free information.

A German artillery signalman captured in Italy made the following comment about signal procedures in his unit. The rule was that no use be made of uncoded references, even over the telephone. Battalions and batteries had code names, and the numerals 1, 2, or 3 following a code name related to the observation post, radio truck, or gun position, respectively. All radio messages were doubly coded, the key being changed every two hours. In actual combat the use of radio was reduced to a minimum because of unhappy experiences with hostile direction finding. As a further precaution, the radio truck was situated half a mile from the gun position.

Section X. GERMAN MULTIPURPOSE CARBIDE LANTERN

1. INTRODUCTION

An unusual lantern, intended to serve a variety of purposes in the field, is now in use by the German Army. The lantern (see fig. 3) is made almost entirely of plastic, with a few parts made of zinc, aluminum, and glass. It is completely demagnetized. Although it is resistant to all weather conditions, it is less durable than steel or brass, and the Germans admit that it must be handled with care.

The most notable feature of this piece of equipment is its adaptability for different purposes. The principal means of illumination is acetylene gas (carbide), but candles may be substituted. The lantern can be dimmed or completely blacked out by means of zinc screens. There is a special front screen with a slotted slide for lighting reference points. Just above this there is a circular slide, which can be regulated to give varying amounts of light. Zinc side screens may be inserted to darken the sides of the lantern. When not in use, these screens are placed in a pocket at the rear of the lantern. A red or green glass pane can be inserted in the front of the lantern whenever a colored light is desired, as for prearranged signaling.




Figure 3.—German Multipurpose Carbide Lantern.

A spare-parts kit and a plastic container for carbide are issued for each lantern.

2. VARIETY OF USES

The German Army finds many uses for the carbide lantern. In the instruction booklet which accompanies each spare-parts kit, the enemy advises that the lantern be used:

- a. For lighting personnel and equipment shelters, including dugouts;
- b. For lighting small offices, communications centers, and improvised field stables:
- c. For lighting closed vehicles;
- d. For reading maps, compasses, and so on;
- e. For tunnel work, unless safety lamps are required because of explosive gases (the handle is fitted with a hook for work of this type);
- f. For railroad personnel;
- g. As a signal lantern for ponton bridge engineers.

3. METHOD OF OPERATION WITH CARBIDE

a. The round carbide container, which also serves as the lantern's base, should be filled with small lumps of dust-free carbide up to the level of the three flanges on the inside. Then the perforated pressure cover, which is equipped with a spiral spring, is put on (with the spring turned upward). On this spring there is fitted a funnel with a little perforated tube, which points downward. After these preparations, the filled carbide

container is screwed firmly into the lantern. It is important to make certain that the rubber washer is in place.

If, after long use, the threads on the carbide container become dry, they should be greased lightly.

b. The setscrew with a drip needle in the center of the zinc water container must be screwed down firmly. The slotted screw cap at one side of the water container is then unscrewed, the water container is filled to the top, and the screw cap is replaced.

c. The setscrew is given a single turn to the left. Gas is produced by the water dripping into the carbide container. This gas seeps evenly through the burner.

d. The flame should be about $\frac{1}{3}$ inch high, and should burn without hissing. If necessary, the setscrew to the water intake should be regulated.

e. One filling of water will allow the lantern to burn for at least 8 hours if the above directions are followed carefully.

f. After use, the parts which have come into contact with carbide must be cleaned. If this is not done, the life and intensity of the flame will be reduced.

g. Before the lantern is stored away, it should be drained of water. The setscrew should be well oiled.

4. DEFECTIVE BURNING

a. If gas leaks between the lantern and the carbide container, it is probable that the rubber washer has not been placed properly on the carbide container or that

the container itself has not been screwed tightly into the lantern.

b. If the lantern sputters, the slotted screw on the drip system between the water container and the lantern should be tightened with a screwdriver. This screw has a small rubber washer under it.

c. If the burner is stopped up, it must be cleaned with the special cleaning pin provided for this purpose. Any air leak should be sealed. If a new burner is to be inserted, its threads should be coated with the air-sealing substance carried in the spare-parts kit.

5. ACCESSORIES

The spare-parts kit contains seven candles, a candle-holding tube with push spring, a candle-holder base plate, four burners, a wooden case with burner cleaning pins, a large rubber washer for the carbide container and two small washers for sealing the drip system, a plastic container filled with an air-sealing preparation, a plastic container filled with "Stauffer" lubricant, a screwdriver, an extra side pane and an extra front pane (both of clear glass), a red front pane, a green front pane, and an instruction booklet.

PART TWO: JAPAN

Section I. JAPANESE TANK TACTICS

I. GENERAL

A study of information from reliable Japanese sources indicates that the enemy has made changes in his tactical organization and employment of tanks. He evidently has been experimenting with the idea of greatly increasing the concentration of armored strength in a given sector of combat.

One Japanese source illustrates the employment of three tank battalions with an infantry division in a theoretical attack against hostile positions on a front of 3,200 meters (approx. 3,500 yds.). The tanks (probably all light) are organized on a triangular basis: three platoons per company and three companies per battalion (see fig. 4). Apparently, under this new organization, three battalions would constitute a regiment, although the word "regiment" is not used by the Japanese. The plan of attack calls for employment of 135 tanks—45 per battalion, 15 per company, and 5 per platoon.

This organization, greatly increasing the number of tanks per unit, generally follows American and German principles, and indicates that the Japanese have




Figure 4.—Japanese Employment of Three Tank Battalions.

been studying these principles. The previously accepted enemy organization for the light tank company included 10 tanks.

The plan of attack with three battalions attached to an infantry division, as outlined in figure 4, calls for a closely coordinated tank-infantry attack, supported by artillery. This tie-up with infantry has been standard Japanese doctrine for several years. Although the Japanese are believed to have more than one armored division as such, it is apparent that most of their armor will continue to be used within, or attached to, infantry divisions or smaller units. On suitable terrain, this armor is likely to be employed: as a spearhead for infantry attacks, as an integral part of an infantry-tank combat team fighting almost side-by-side, as support for infantry, as an enveloping force, and as a raiding force.

2. USING THREE TANK BATTALIONS

Details of the Japanese method of employing three tank battalions with an infantry division are illustrated in figure 4, which is reproduced from a reliable enemy source. Theoretically, the division is attacking on a front of about 2,500 meters (approx. 2,700 yds.) against "well-established" hostile positions covering a front of about 3,500 yards. The tank attack is being made in three waves or echelons. Two of the infantry regiments and two of the tank battalions are moving into the attack, while the third infantry regiment and the third tank battalion are in division reserve.

The first tank echelon consists of two tank companies, one in front of each front-line infantry regiment, under the direct control of the regimental commander. The mission of this echelon is to "neutralize antitank guns and strong fire points (which appear to be composed of strong tanks) and thus establish a passage for the main attacking force"—the second echelon.

The second tank echelon, moving 400 to 500 yards behind the first, consists of four tank companies, two in each regimental sector. Each company moves a short distance in front of an infantry battalion, four of which are in the front line. The tank companies are attached to these battalions and are under the battalion command in each case. These tanks "lead and support the attacking infantry." Depending on the situation, the support battalion of each front-line regiment may be called upon to "leap-frog" through the front-line troops and take up the attack.

The third tank echelon, consisting of one battalion, is held in reserve "under the direct control of the division commander." These tanks, "in order to exploit a battle success or to strengthen the division's striking power, may be employed to reinforce any area requiring it, or may be attached to any infantry unit as reinforcements," the Japanese state.

Previously established Japanese doctrine called for the use of only one tank company (consisting of 10 tanks) to each infantry regiment for such tank-infan-

try roles as outlined above. Apparently this was not enough armor for the Japanese. In a booklet titled "An Example of a Tank-unit Attack Formation," the enemy commented as follows:

For an attack on a lightly held position, 10 tanks are not sufficient; at least 30 to 40 are required. For an attack on a strongly established position, at least 60 tanks are necessary. It is necessary to increase the number of tanks from 60 to 100 when the strength of the position has been increased, or when bombing and shelling are intense.

The Japanese set forth the following "views" regarding the neutralization of antitank guns prior to the actual assault by tanks and infantry:

With the assault supporting fire, destroy or at least attempt to neutralize the hostile antitank guns. At the beginning of the attack, direct the artillery to neutralize the four to six hostile antitank guns in front of each battalion of attacking infantry. Draw out hostile antitank fire frequently by using a decoy tank prior to the actual assault. Then neutralize the antitank fire (at times using tanks as artillery).

3. USE OF TANKS ON TARAWA

U. S. observers report that the Japanese had six or seven light tanks (Model 2595) in the defensive setup on Tarawa Island. Only two of these engaged in a tank-to-tank battle with our forces. The others were knocked out by naval and other gunfire.

After U. S. forces had captured the airport, and after the latter had been bombed by the Japanese, an enemy tank came out of a revetment, apparently to determine what damage had been done by the bombing.

Flying the Rising Sun flag, the enemy tank approached two U. S. medium tanks, turned while several hundred yards away, turned around again, and fired two rounds while approaching our tanks. Having missed its target, the enemy tank then did an about face and fled.

In another engagement, an armor-piercing shell from a U. S. medium tank tore the turret off the top of a Japanese light tank and put it out of action.

Except while in low gear, the Model 2595 light tank is not well adapted for movement over rough terrain. In low gear, it can cross fairly high obstacles and climb steep slopes. It can operate in water up to $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep and travel up to 90 miles without refueling.

This tank is highly vulnerable to close-in attack by small weapons, such as sticky grenades and Molotov cocktails. It can be set afire easily. Therefore, incendiary weapons are particularly valuable for combatting it at close quarters. No weapon in the tank can be depressed lower than 20 degrees below the horizontal, thereby leaving a dead space extending 23 feet in all directions from the tank, as shown in figure 5. Shaded areas have .25-inch armor and are the most vulnerable spots to small-arms fire and incendiary grenades. A man within this distance of the tank is not only in a favorable position to use his weapons, but he is comparatively safe from any of the tank's weapons.

In every strategic area of the island, the Japanese




Figure 5.—Dead Space around Japanese Model 2595 Light Tank.

had built tank revetments, which were located so that tanks in them could fire at soldiers and boats crossing the reef or at other suitable targets (see fig. 6). Most of the revetments were mutually supporting with other defense weapons. The revetments were located singly, indicating that the tanks were to be operated individually in defense of the island.

The revetments sloped into the ground. The coconut-log sides extended about 4 feet above ground level. The tanks were driven forward into the revetments, permitting the 37-mm guns to fire to the front. To get into action, the tanks had to back out of the revetments and then turn around.




Figure 6.—Japanese Tank Revetment (Tarawa).

Section II. JAPANESE ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND COASTAL DEFENSES

1. GENERAL

Considerable information on Japanese anti-aircraft and coastal defenses has been obtained through photographic reconnaissance and actual study of captured positions. This section contains, among other items, a number of illustrations showing various patterns and details of these positions. Reference may be made to *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 6, pages 45-48, for information previously carried on the subject.

a. As to Location

The Japanese make a general practice of locating anti-aircraft positions so that they will serve a dual, or even a triple, purpose. If defending an area along a seacoast, the enemy locates positions so that the guns can fire on hostile ships and landing boats as well as on hostile aircraft or ground troops. Batteries usually are found within 1 mile of airfields or camp sites. The guns are generally concentrated between the airfields or camp sites and the sea approaches, or along the shore. The light batteries are rarely placed outside the 1-mile radius, except along beaches. The heavies have been located as far as 5 miles from defended areas.

In the South Pacific, battery positions along the shore often appear in natural clearings, or in clearings that have been enlarged. Usually they are located on ridges or on the sides of ridges. Nearby trees are utilized as cover for personnel and supplies. If a battery located near the shore has an arc or linear pattern, with no obstructions between it and the sea, it can safely be assumed that the guns are used for coastal defense as well as for antiaircraft purposes.

b. As to Construction

Generally speaking, Japanese gun emplacements are constructed similar to those of other nations at war. In most batteries the emplacements are circular in plan. However, it is common for this shape to be modified by ready magazines, dugouts, and so forth which project from the circle. Blast walls before entrances, drainage ditches, entrance ramps, and double revetments are additional features of an emplacement.

In the South Pacific area, where gun batteries usually are hastily emplaced, the simple circular emplacement predominates. In most of these cases ammunition is kept in small buildings and dugouts near each emplacement. It must be noted, however, that emplacements will tend to become more complex (that is, have more added features connected directly with the emplacement) if the battery remains at the same location for some time. The original construction for the establishment of a battery usually involves only the building

of simple circular emplacements, often without entrances. Later, entrances are cut through, ready magazines are added, blast walls are constructed, and control positions and personnel shelters are built.

In the Southwest Pacific, the antiaircraft batteries have a more permanent aspect, although examples of the simple circular emplacement are common. For example, at Kavieng, New Ireland, ready magazines are built into bulges in the revetments, and, in some cases, blast walls are present before the entrance to the emplacement.

Individual emplacements for batteries located deep within Japanese-held areas are generally more elaborate than those found to date. At Soerabaja, Java, emplacements for a 75-mm antiaircraft battery have high sandbag revetments with ammunition ready magazines constructed in the sides of the revetments. The revetments are covered with sod, and their inner walls are lined with vertically placed lumber.

c. As to Patterns

In grouping their gun emplacements, the Japanese generally place them in one of four patterns: in an arc, in a line, in a triangle, or in a rough rectangle (trapezoid). The typical heavy antiaircraft position usually consists of six guns. However, this number has varied from 2 to 12 guns. Four-gun positions have been found frequently in the past. The number of guns in light antiaircraft positions is apt to vary considerably, de-

pending on the number of weapons available. Both light and heavy positions are likely to have the support of machine guns, sited either within the position or at a short distance from it. When an antiaircraft position is located on or immediately inshore of a beach, supporting machine guns usually are sited on the edge of the beach.

d. As to Camouflage

Except for the use of sod to cover revetments, the Japanese until recent months made little effort to conceal antiaircraft positions. However, they are now utilizing palm-frond canopies quite extensively in camouflaging open emplacements. Rope netting is also used to some extent. Several antiaircraft batteries at Vila, Kolombangara Island, were emplaced in coconut groves with apparently little regard for firing obstructions. The Japanese also have made considerable use of dummy positions, dummy planes, and unserviceable planes as decoys.

2. EXAMPLES OF POSITIONS

Heavy U. S. bombing attacks apparently have forced the Japanese to adopt antiaircraft defenses designed to afford maximum protection for weapons and gun crews. For example, at Kavieng, New Ireland, the Japanese have built double-revetted emplacements for 25-mm automatic weapons. Around the first revetment is a second one of like strength and construction.

**SUMMARY OF CALIBER AND EMPLACEMENT SIZES (APPROXIMATE)
OF THE MORE COMMON JAPANESE ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND COASTAL-DEFENSE WEAPONS**

	Caliber	Inside Diameter of Emplace- ment	AA	Coastal Defense	Dual Purpose	Remarks
Light	7.7-mm	6 to 8 ft	X			Weapon captured on Attu was in 10-foot emplacement.
	13-mm	8 to 10 ft			X	Found also as twin mount; weapon captured on Guadalcanal was in 10- to 12-ft emplacement.
	20-mm	8 to 15 ft			X	Inner diameter should average about 12 ft. Emplacements 8, 9, and 10 feet wide found on Attu.
	25-mm	12 to 14 ft			X	Triple mount captured on Guadalcanal in 14-ft emplacement. Twin mount on Kiska in 15-ft emplacement.
	40-mm	10 to 12 ft	X			Twin mount captured at Munda in 10- to 12-ft emplacement.
Heavy	75-mm	18 to 20 ft			X	Batteries captured on Attu were in 18- to 20-ft emplacements. With spiders covered, a 15-ft emplacement is adequate.
	105-mm	20 to 24 ft			X	Photos of emplacement at unknown locality measured approximately 24 ft in inner diameter.
	127-mm	22 to 26 ft		X	X	Captured battery on Kiska was located in 22-ft emplacements. Coastal-defense battery captured on Kiska was in 20-ft emplacements.

X—indicates purpose of weapon

The outer revetment is higher than the top of the inner one. This affords better protection of the gun and crew, but it limits the minimum angle of depression at which the gun may fire.

An ammunition and personnel shelter has been built into the wall of the outer revetment, from which it projects. This shelter, covered with logs, affords good protection for gun crews and ammunition handlers. Its closeness to the gun insures a rapid flow of ammunition, while its construction and location minimize the danger to the gun crew in case of a direct hit.

The interiors of these emplacements are revetted with heavy logs and timber or with concrete.

a. Six-gun Heavy Battery (Attu)

Figure 7 is an over-all view of a Japanese six-gun anti-aircraft battery on an Attu beach. This wide arc pattern is a typical arrangement for six-gun heavies in a dual-purpose role. The emplacements measured 18 to 20 feet in inner diameter and were about 5 feet deep. Small dugouts were located in the inner walls of the revetments for ammunition storage. From such emplacements, tunnels frequently lead into nearby living quarters. Note the trenches and foxholes.

b. Combination of Batteries (Burma)

Figure 8 illustrates the Japanese use of more than one anti-aircraft battery in a position (Rangoon, Burma). Three heavy batteries and one light battery, plus ten machine guns, constitute the combined de-

fense. Note that two gun emplacements are empty in each of the heavy batteries at the top of the illustration. Also note the arc arrangements with command posts centrally located. The heavies are probably 75-mm (Model 88) anti-aircraft guns, while the lights are probably 20-mm (Model 98) dual-purpose machine cannon.




Figure 7.

c. Combination of Batteries (Kolombangara)

This Japanese arrangement of two heavy anti-aircraft batteries, supported by emplaced machine guns, varies from others in that five guns per battery are utilized instead of six or four (see fig. 9). Note that the arc arrangements for the two batteries curve in opposite directions.




Figure 8.




Figure 9.




Figure 10.




Figure 11.

d. Light Battery on Mounds

At Heho airfield in Burma the Japanese have a three-gun light battery on clay-covered mounds (see fig. 10). Two of the three mounds also have machine-gun emplacements. The lights are 20-mm machine cannon. Note that ammunition is probably stored between two of the light antiaircraft positions.

e. Heavy AA-Coastal Defense Battery

Figure 11 shows a six-gun heavy dual-purpose battery near the Kahili airfield, Bougainville Island. Note

the thick revetments, shore location, and inner diameters of emplacements—all of which help to make this position suitable for coast defense. The caliber of these guns may be 105-mm.

f. Three-gun AA-Coastal Defense Battery

A Japanese three-gun heavy dual-purpose battery, located on Wake Island, is shown in figure 12. Note the thick revetments, blast walls, and heavily revetted command post. These are large-caliber guns.




Figure 12.

Section III. TWO AA/AT POSITIONS¹

1. GENERAL

Details of two Japanese antiaircraft-antitank positions, designed for all-around defense, are presented below. This information, from reliable Japanese sources, deals with the construction of a machine-cannon battery position and the construction of an antiaircraft battery position. The former apparently is designed for the enemy's Model 98 (1938) 20-mm antiaircraft-antitank machine cannon, while the latter probably is designed primarily for the Model 88, 75-mm antiaircraft gun, which also has been employed by the Japanese as an antitank weapon. Such positions, according to the Japanese, can be constructed in two weeks. It is believed that these positions are "models" and represent developments that are largely theoretical. No reports of their actual existence have been received.

2. MACHINE-CANNON BATTERY POSITION

Figure 13 is a sketch of the machine-cannon position. Although it appears to be designed for the 20-mm dual-purpose machine cannon, the Japanese may also use

¹ In connection with this section, reference may profitably be made to Section II of this issue, to "Antiaircraft Positions" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 6 pp. 45-48), and to "Defense of Betio Island" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 1-35).




Figure 13.—Japanese Machine-cannon Battery Position.




Figure 14.—Japanese Anti-aircraft Battery Position.

other types of guns in such positions. For example, they have employed the Model 41, 75-mm mountain gun (an infantry weapon) in an antitank role, firing an armor-piercing round.

It is interesting to note, among other things, the octopus-like arrangement of communication trenches, all of which are supposed to be covered from aerial observation. There are a total of eight gun emplacements, two per platoon. Personnel shelters are provided for each gun emplacement, and a shelter-protected ammunition dump is provided for each platoon. The antitank trenches and mines are undoubtedly located in the areas most suited for tank attacks.

3. ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY POSITION

Figure 14 is a sketch of the Japanese antiaircraft battery position. Although it has only four gun emplacements, the general setup follows the same pattern as the machine-cannon position. Note that on the right side of the position the antitank trench-minefield defenses extend to the stream.

Section IV. HOW A COMBAT PATROL CAPTURED TWO JAPANESE

1. INTRODUCTION

Details of how a U. S. combat patrol dealt successfully with a Japanese patrol in New Guinea are presented below. These details were carefully planned and carefully executed, and are recited here because they may be helpful to U. S. patrols in future operations.

The patrol was led by Lieutenant A, who a few months before had received a Distinguished Service Cross for his action—as a noncommissioned officer—at Sanananda. He suggested the patrol operation and asked permission to lead it. He selected 10 enlisted men, without regard for grades and ratings, and a number of natives to constitute the patrol. The enlisted men, all volunteers, had had considerable experience in patrolling against the Japanese.

The military personnel were equipped with carbines, Browning automatic rifles, and Garand rifles. The natives, unarmed, carried an eight-day supply of “J” rations (for jungle use—now discontinued), extra ammunition, and rice and bully beef for themselves. They also carried the automatic rifles most of the time.

The patrol operation took place in the area of Old Yagomi, about 70 miles southeast of Madang.

2. THE NARRATIVE

The patrol left Sel about mid-morning 23 January 1944, bivouacked overnight at Talmio village, and arrived in the vicinity of an observation post southwest of Old Yagomi at 1530. At this observation post, Lieutenant A obtained considerable information about Japanese activities in the area, and decided to set up an ambush on two trails about 500 yards from the mouth of the Yaut river.

The patrol was split. Lieutenant A took seven men to cover the trail most likely to be used by the Japanese, and Lieutenant B—who had come up to relieve the observation-post officer—took three men from the patrol and two from the observation post to cover the second trail. Both parties bivouacked in the vicinity of the observation post the night of 24-25 January. Most of the native carriers were left in this vicinity when the ambush was set on 25 January.

Two men took up positions as shown in (2) and (3), figure 15. They were to allow the leading Japanese soldier to walk into the defile and were to jump on the second enemy soldier from the rear as he started down into the defile. The patrol leader, Lieutenant A, was in position (1). He was to jump down upon the first Japanese as soon as the men in (2) started the action. A rifleman at position (7) was to shoot the third Japanese as soon as (2) and (3) had leaped down from behind their log. At the same time a Browning automatic rifleman at position (6) was to fire on the re-




Figure 15.—Diagram of Ambush by U. S. Patrol.

maining Japanese. The rifleman at position (8) was to fire on any target which might endanger the execution of the plan. The men behind the rock, positions (4) and (5), were to assist where they were needed. The men at positions (2), (3), (4), and (5) were not allowed to have their arms with them, because the patrol leader was afraid someone would get excited and start shooting—he wanted to take the first two Japs alive. However, the Americans' rifles (carbines) were kept in convenient places nearby.

A police boy was posted on the high cliff (9) overlooking the Yaut river (see fig. 15) with instructions to come back and notify Lieutenant A as soon as the Japanese started crossing the river. The patrol leader figured he would have about 20 minutes' warning of the approach of the Japanese patrol. A few native carriers, to carry back the two expected prisoners, were left about 200 yards in rear of the patrol.

The ambush proceeded exactly as planned. At 0940, 25 January, the police boy came back and told Lieutenant A that six Japanese had crossed the river. About 30 minutes later the enemy patrol approached at a fairly brisk pace along the straight portion of the trail. The leading Japanese held his rifle at approximately the "port-arms" position, and moved about 5 yards ahead of the second man. The third enemy soldier closed on the heels of the second man as the latter approached the small log behind which our men at position (2) and (3) were hidden. The third

Japanese was so close that when he was shot, by the rifleman at (7), his rifle fell on one of the two men jumping on the second Japanese. Meanwhile, according to plan, Lieutenant A jumped on his man and the Browning automatic rifleman mowed down the three remaining Japanese. The second Jap was subdued without difficulty. Lieutenant A had a fierce struggle with his foe, a big man, and had to club him over the head with his pistol and knock him out.

The whole show was over in 30 seconds. Except for Lieutenant A, who was bitten on the hand, the U. S. patrol suffered no casualties. Both captives were stripped of clothing except pants and shoes. The unconscious Jap was tied to a pole and carried out by the native carriers, who had come forward, and the other prisoner, securely tied, was walked out. As the patrol hurried out of the immediate area, a rear guard consisting of the Browning automatic rifleman and a man with a carbine covered the movement.

No other Japs were seen. The police boys obliterated all tracks to keep other Japanese from determining the strength of the U. S. patrol. The four dead Japanese were left on the ground. The unconscious Japanese soon recovered and his wounds were bandaged. He and the other prisoner were securely bound and guarded while the patrol bivouacked the night of 25-26 January.

Lieutenant A attributes the success of the operation to:

- a. Good planning and reconnaissance;

- b. Proper use of the police boys;
 - c. Cool-headed action by each member of the patrol;
- and
- d. Split-second timing.

Section V. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MEASURES

1. GENERAL

Some Japanese measures concerning intelligence and security are presented below. For additional information on these subjects, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pages 43-46, and the following issues of Vol. I: No. 12, pages 65-71; No. 10, page 86; No. 8, pages 58-59; and No. 6, pages 16-17.

Japanese intelligence apparently was not completely up to date on U. S. equipment at the time our forces landed on Makin Island. The defending enemy troops evidently thought our amphibious personnel carriers (alligators) were landing boats, and waited for the infantry to disembark before opening fire. When the alligators came out of the water, the Japanese fled their positions, apparently believing the alligators were tanks.

That the Japanese are interested not only in details of U. S. arms and equipment but also in the characteristics of the U. S. soldier is borne out from the following quotation from an enemy treatise:

It is very important to know the enemy [Americans]. What about him? If you do not know the enemy, you cannot prepare against him. If you understand the enemy's way of

thinking and the combat methods he has used in the past, you can make preparations before you oppose him.

2. ENEMY VIEWS ON HANDLING PRISONERS

The views of a Japanese naval ensign on handling prisoners of war are presented below. While these views are not necessarily enemy doctrine, it is believed that they are pretty well in line with Japanese thought on the subject. The ensign's views tend to verify that the enemy is very much interested in prisoner-of-war information, and that he is aware of the talkative tendencies of some United Nations soldiers. The ensign's views:

a. Insofar as possible, prisoners should be picked up separately.

b. Conversation and communication between prisoners should be restricted.

c. Captured documents, messages, and other items of intelligence value should be used in connection with the interrogation of prisoners. These should be studied and arranged in a manner convenient for reference. The main idea is to get the prisoners to interpret these documents as completely as possible.

d. In interrogating, force should be the guiding principle. Because the prisoner's native language is different from ours, it is difficult to take advantage of any slip of his tongue, to give a detailed examination, or to use indirect-questioning methods (especially when the interrogator lacks confidence in his vocabulary). Therefore, it is easier (for the interrogator) to conduct a formal interview. The feeling that the victor is superior and the loser inferior should pervade the interrogation. If necessary, you should demand that questions and answers be made in writing.

e. Until the object of the interrogation has been attained, the prisoner should be made to feel anxious about his fate, should become physically exhausted. Consideration should be given to his quarters, food and drink, surveillance, and so forth.

3. BURYING ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Reliable Japanese sources indicate that the enemy often buries arms and equipment he cannot evacuate during withdrawals.

The following order was issued to a Japanese unit:

All unrequired ammunition will be buried in order to prevent hostile forces from using it when they penetrate our position.

Another unit received the following order:

If time permits, bury the gun in a safe location. The breech-block and gun sight will be removed and carried back at the time of retreat.

U. S. troops are warned that the Japanese have been known to booby-trap buried arms and equipment, and that the proper precautions should be taken when this buried "treasure" is located.

4. STANDARDS FOR CENSORING MAIL

Within recent months the Japanese have adopted the following standards for censoring mail:

a. In letters you will not mention any unusual conditions of forces, any Army plans, or any thoughts that might affect morale at home.

b. You will make no comment regarding unit dispositions, supplies and allowances, or any other matter that would be militarily injurious.

c. You will not even hazard a guess as to the sector of operations or your location.

d. You will not refer to the progress of operations, or to our losses (personnel, equipment, supplies, and so forth).

e. You will not mention identification numbers of forces or names of commanding officers above the rank of force commanders.

f. You may write about air attacks, but not about the effectiveness of our anti-aircraft weapons and so forth.

g. You will not mention anything about low morale or make any comment which might become the source of wild rumors.

h. You will not make exaggerated comments concerning hardships or suffering in the combat zones.

i. You will not write about any lingering desire to go home, or about any matter that might lead those at home to presume our morale is low.

Section VI. IMPROVISED LAND MINE USED BY JAPANESE

1. INTRODUCTION

Numerous types of explosive charges have been improvised by the Japanese since the start of the war, including land mines and booby traps. A recent report from the South Pacific describes a crudely constructed, makeshift land mine that the enemy is using. The mine cannot be regarded as very dependable, and it is not clear whether its use is due to a shortage of the Model 93 land mine or to an attempt by the enemy to improvise a mine with a heavier charge than the Model 93.¹

2. DESCRIPTION

Figure 16 shows one of these mines as a whole and also the top cover. The mine container is a rectangular box with a cover securely fastened by friction tape. Since the mine is designed for its blast effect, rather than for fragmentation, the box may be made of any light metal, wood, or plastic. The box contains 12 blocks of explosive, each wrapped in wax black paper, and either a Model 91 or 97 hand grenade. Two holes are punched through the cover. The grenade fuze

¹ For details of the Model 93 land mine, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 2-5.




Figure 16.—Japanese Improvised Land Mine.

sticks through one of the two holes, projecting about $\frac{3}{8}$ inch outside. The other hole is for a detonator in case one is used instead of the grenade. A small piece of string is tied around the box and looped through the friction tape.

Should the Japanese attempt to utilize this weapon as an antitank mine, they would have to remove the safety pin on the grenade. Then, if the fuze is hit a hard blow, the bursting charge will explode after a delay of 4 to 5 seconds and set off the charge.

The weapon may also be used as an antipersonnel mine or booby trap.

The effect of this mine has not yet been tested.

Section VII. JAPANESE HINTS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

1. INTRODUCTION

A Japanese treatise, "Hints for the Soldier," has been circulated in some areas of the South Pacific during recent months. This treatise places renewed emphasis on such matters as individual firing of small-caliber weapons, hand-to-hand combat, and physical endurance. It recognizes that the hostile forces have a "superior number of weapons," and recommends measures to overcome this handicap.

2. THE TREATISE

Unfounded self-confidence arising from the tradition that "we've always won" is of no great value. Confidence in victory should be based on superior physical endurance and thorough training. It is essential that a soldier be proficient in the use of firearms, in the use of cold steel, and in marching.

With regard to shooting, large quantities of ammunition are seldom available at the front; therefore expert marksmanship must be developed during the training period. The principle "Get a man with every round" is very sound. This is particularly important with regard to heavy weapons. You must avoid random firing; aim your shots well.

Train yourself to fire rifles and light machine guns from the hip, and to fire the grenade discharger in a horizontal position.

[Under such circumstance the Japanese probably press the discharger against a tree, log, stump, or rock]. In this manner, you should be able to fire these weapons without conscious effort in case hostile forces make an unexpected attack. If we immediately take the initiative, the hostile forces will throw away their arms and flee; conversely, it is essential not to let the opposition take the initiative.

When fired upon unexpectedly by hostile artillery, deploy and lie prone without moving.

Go about your duties silently. Hostile forces will fire blindly in the direction from which they hear the sound of voices.

Never neglect to dig in whenever you make a halt; always remember that digging in is essential, whether you are going to attack or to be attacked.

Deploying and crawling will reduce casualties, and are the first steps toward victory. It should be known that if you deploy and conceal yourself there will be no casualties from hostile bombing, or from rifle or artillery fire.

A soldier should never forget his camouflage.

No soldier should lose his direction. When assigned as a runner or on a patrol, mark your direction by breaking branches of trees or by making notches on the bark of trees as you go out.

You should engage in bayonet practice every day, with real weapons. Practice until the mind, the body, and the weapon are all coordinated in a perfect forward thrust. Drive the bayonet home to the hilt, and immediately tackle a second and third "enemy". Such practice is excellent for the morale.

Hand-to-hand combat is the deciding factor in an engagement, and is most feared by the American and Australian forces.

Do not allow yourself to be captured, even if the alter-

native is death. Bear in mind that capture disgraces not only the Army but also your parents and family, who will never be able to hold up their heads again. Always save the last round for yourself.

Endure all hardships. Shortage of rations is a normal condition. The saying "Poverty dulls the wit" should not hold true for military men.

Section VIII. MORALE, CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS

1. INTRODUCTION

The information presented in this section supplements data which have appeared in previous issues of the *Intelligence Bulletin* regarding the morale and individual characteristics of Japanese soldiers. For a complete reference to this data, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 8, p. 69, and Vol. II, No. 9, pp. 44-47.

2. A LIEUTENANT SPEAKS OUT

A statement made by a Japanese lieutenant describes the hardships forced upon the enemy in New Guinea by the American and Australian air, ground, and naval forces. The statement, which ends with boasting threats, is presented below.

In air power, to put it briefly, we are about a century behind America and Germany. We who have participated in the New Guinea fighting are in position to appreciate at first hand the importance of air power. Those living in peace and safety at home talk about our air superiority in China. This is exceedingly childish chatter. If you have not experienced a continuous bombardment by formations of Lockheeds and North Americans, or 50 to 60 bombers, a true appreciation of air superiority is well nigh impossible.

This present war is termed a war of supply. Shipping is

the key to victory or defeat. To have regular shipping lanes, air superiority is essential. Ah! If we only had air superiority! Even the privates here voice the same opinion.

Let us examine the situation. In the battle for Salamaua, we were bombed and strafed relentlessly day and night for about six months. We left Sio with 10 days' rations, which must last for 25 days. . . . We fight while eating only grass. However, we must not complain about it to our superior officers. Since coming to New Guinea, I fully appreciate the value of even 1 gram of rice. If we only had salt and matches in the combat area, we could cope with anything. Indeed, these are supposed to be absolutely essential. How laughable! A certain labor unit existed for about two weeks on only pumpkin.

What of the Americans and Australians? They can boast only of their material power. Wait and see! We will wage a war of annihilation. The feelings of every officer and man throughout the Army are churning with a desire to massacre all Americans and Australians.

3. DEATH AND THE JAPANESE SOLDIER

Before entering a theater of operations, the Japanese prepare themselves for possible death. Fingernails, toenails, and locks of hair are often taken from every man in a unit, and when a soldier is killed these items are sent to his family in Japan. Also, whenever possible, the ashes of deceased soldiers are sent home, generally by special courier. That this is an important and solemn pilgrimage is apparent from the following story written by a private and published in a Japanese magazine:

On this occasion I have returned from the front bringing the remains of the fallen soldiers. In the Army we regard

these ashes as more precious than living beings. When we were on board ship we were given strict instructions by the officer-in-charge as follows:

"You are about to cross seas that are dominated by enemy submarines. You know now what may befall you. If the ashes of those who have fallen in battle are lost and their spirits are again made to meet a second death, we who are responsible for bringing home these ashes will be without excuse before their bereaved families. Whatever happens, even though the ship sinks, do all you can to save these ashes."

This officer-in-charge is fond of his glass, but throughout the whole voyage he never touched a drop of *sake*. Every one of us in charge of these boxes of ashes kept them by our sides continually. At night we tied them to our waists with a rope attached to a life belt, so that if we were struck by a torpedo and had to dive overboard, though we might be drowned, the boxes of ashes would certainly float.

4. MISCELLANEOUS BRIEFS

The following items, loosely related, give further insight into Japanese morale and characteristics:

Just before a big counterattack against U. S. forces at Torokina on Bougainville, Japanese officers tried to boost the morale of their men by telling them that there were enough rations and tobacco within the U. S. lines to supply the Japanese for three years if they could be captured.

Such statements have been made by Japanese officers on other occasions for the same purpose.

A Japanese soldier dejectedly stated that U. S. weapons "are made for jungle warfare and are superior

in quality. If we had their weapons, we could annihilate them in one day. Unfortunately we haven't them!"

Members of a Japanese unit on Bougainville were exhorted as follows:

The time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of a sharp sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack, assault, and destroy everything. Cut, slash, and mow them [Americans] down. May the color of the red emblem [probably refers to the red insignia of the 6th Division] of memory on our arms be deepened with the blood of the American rascals. Our cry of victory at Torokina Bay will be shouted resoundingly to our native land. We are invincible. Always attack. . .

An officer who has returned from duty in the Pacific theater of operations debunks any feeling that the Japanese soldier possesses anything approaching "super" qualities. This officer said:

"I feel that it was a mistake to be given the idea, as we were, that the Jap is practically an unconquerable superman. We had repeated lectures to this effect."

PART THREE: UNITED NATIONS

Section I. SOUVENIR HUNTING IS STILL A PROBLEM

Souvenir hunting in combat zones continues to be a matter requiring caution. It is perhaps hard for some men to realize that a scrap of paper or a small metal plate with a few words in a foreign language on it can be of great ultimate significance in analyzing the military and economic resources of the enemy.^{1 2}

Because of the activities of souvenir hunters during operations on more than one Pacific island, much material of known and probable value was carried away, and almost all enemy documents, personal papers, weapons, and equipment were so rummaged through and scattered about that their eventual salvage was either unnecessarily delayed or rendered impossible. Souvenir hunting was not confined to any one unit or group, but was undertaken by construction

¹In connection with this section, reference should be made to two articles which have previously appeared in the *Intelligence Bulletin*: "Souvenir Hunters Cause Needless Loss of Lives" (Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 72-74) and "Three Jeers for the Souvenir Sap" (Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 80-82).

²A letter dealing with "Destruction by Souvenir Hunters of Valuable Intelligence Data" was recently sent by the Adjutant General to the major commands, overseas theaters, and base commands. (AG 386.3, 2 March 1944, OB-S-B-M, 10 March 1944).

battalions, defense forces, and ship's crews—personnel who came ashore after the assault phase had been completed. Not that there had been any lag between the assault and the beginning of the souvenir hunting. Even by mid-afternoon of the first day, considerable damage had been done, for houses, stores, and barracks had been stripped almost as fast as they had been taken.

As experienced observers have pointed out, every effort must be made, through training, indoctrination, and briefing immediately before an operation, to minimize indiscriminate souvenir hunting and to insure the utmost cooperation between troops and construction units on one hand and intelligence personnel on the other.

At present there is a vital need for every available name plate from enemy matériel of every description. It is essential that, whenever possible, the name plate be left on the captured equipment to which it pertains. In recent weeks an increasing number of loose name plates have been confiscated from the mails by censors. Although it is a War Department policy that military personnel be treated as generously as possible when they request permission to retain souvenirs, it is obvious that items of intelligence value must be held for examination by the proper authorities. Experience has shown again and again that the most trivial-looking items can reveal desperately needed information concerning the enemy.

Sometimes it has proved advisable to post guards over captured command posts, radio stations, supply dumps, and so on, so that documents and matériel can be examined thoroughly without having been subjected to previous handling and the resulting damage and loss.

The responsibility for turning in for examination any random documents or pieces of equipment found by military personnel of course rests directly with the officers in charge of the various units involved in an operation.

The brighter side of the picture—and there very definitely is a brighter side—is illustrated by the following statement by a high-ranking U. S. officer who fought the Japanese on Rendova:

“If handled properly, souvenir collecting pays dividends; if not, it hurts morale and ruins an excellent source of information. Our rule was that a soldier could keep a souvenir if he were given clearance by his company commander, the Intelligence officer, and the Ordnance officer. The men cooperated wonderfully, and it was through ‘souvenirs’ brought in by collectors that we knew, two hours after we reached Rendova, the enemy’s strength and disposition of troops over the previous two months’ period.”

Section II. SECURITY NOTES

1. RUMORS

From a Southwest Pacific Command, there comes a new version of an old anecdote which is a discerning, if indirect, comment on the gullibility of human nature.

"A real estate man arrived at the gates of Heaven, confident that he already had an option on a piece of property there, inasmuch as he had never robbed widows or orphans—at least, not much.

"St. Peter was adamant, however. 'There's no room for you,' he said. 'All allotments set aside for real estate men have already been taken up on perpetual lease.'

"Although no longer on his native heath, the applicant still had some of the earthly instincts of all successful real estate agents. He asked permission just to come in and look around. All was as St. Peter had said. So the real estate man stepped up onto a bench on the main boulevard and shouted, 'Oil has been discovered in Hell!'

"There was instant pandemonium and a mad exodus of real estate men, complete with hastily packed suitcases, rushing off to Hell. St. Peter watched the newcomer's face light up with satisfaction at his own cleverness and then slowly cloud over with worry. Sud-

denly the newcomer, too, grabbed his suitcase and raced after the real estate men. As he gathered speed, he shouted back to St. Peter, 'You know, there may be something to that rumor!' "

Unfortunately, there is a large element of psychological truth in this story. Rumors are contagious, and affect not only those among whom they are spread, but also the rumor-monger himself.

2. SENSE AND CENSORSHIP

Most breaches of security that censors come across are clearly not intentional. They stem from a soldier's ignorance of what he should and should not write in a letter, or from his faulty judgment as to what may be included without breaching security.

Intentional breaches are nearly always caused by someone's desire to appear clever, and are very seldom committed with treasonable intent. An example of the former was the case of a soldier who filled a letter with classified matters which he thought would entertain the folks at home, and entrusted it to a friend who was returning to the States. ("Don't let the postmark of this letter surprise you, because I'm not at home—" his letter began.) This use of unauthorized channels to carry mail from the field to persons at home is a flagrant violation of censorship, and subjects not only the writer, but the carrier as well, to severe disciplinary action. This particular writer committed an even graver violation, however. In his letter he disclosed in detail:

a. his movements through the South Pacific area from the beginning of 1943, specifically mentioning dates and places;

b. the casualties of units in combat;

c. the movements of other units, and

d. enough information about military plans for the future to endanger the success of an entire operation.

Besides inviting court-martial, this man jeopardized the lives of his fellow soldiers.

Press associations, newspapers, and radio stations sometimes unwittingly influence soldiers and their parents and friends to violate censorship regulations. A press association recently carried a story telling how a civilian well versed in animal lore was trying to help parents determine where their sons were located.

Unfortunately the enemy also has personnel well versed in animal lore. Therefore, such attempts to reveal locations amount, in reality, to using a code which is easily understood by our enemies.

The use of codes of any type is strictly against security regulations, and violators are subject to penalties ranging from a reprimand to a court-martial.

These cases, particularly the former, demonstrate two urgent needs: first, the need for greater and continued security education for troops, and, second, the need for keeping secret military information—especially that involving future operations—out of discussions in the presence of persons whose duties do not require such knowledge.

On the other hand, the men who commit breaches of security out of sheer ignorance of what the censor can and cannot pass would benefit from a practice recently instituted by an Australian unit. This unit has established what it calls a "Censor's Diary." Censored portions of letters are posted on a notice board, with brief comments by the censor officer explaining why these portions are not suitable for transmission. The enlisted men have praised the innovation as being a great help, and the censors have found that it has lightened their work to a remarkable degree.

A South African major general, recommending this scheme for consideration by the units of his command, sensibly points out that several precautions must be observed: "Personal and family matters should not be published. Typed copies of extracts should be posted, *so that the writers' identities are not revealed.* Examples which will benefit the largest number should be selected, and comments should be brief, pithy, and constructive."

DISTRIBUTION: C and H (2)

(For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6.)

